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Abstract
We initiate the study of quantum races, games where two or more quantum computers
compete to solve a computational problem. While the problem of dueling algorithms has been
studied for classical deterministic algorithms [IKL+11], the quantum case presents additional
sources of uncertainty for the players. The foremost among these is that players do not know if
they have solved the problem until they measure their quantum state. This question of “when to
measure?” presents a very interesting strategic problem. We develop a game-theoretic model
of a multiplayer quantum race, and find an approximate Nash equilibrium where all players
play the same strategy. In the two-party case, we further show that this strategy is nearly
optimal in terms of payoff among all symmetric Nash equilibria. A key role in our analysis of
quantum races is played by a more tractable version of the game where there is no payout on a
tie; for such races we completely characterize the Nash equilibria in the two-party case.
One application of our results is to the stability of the Bitcoin protocol when mining is done
by quantum computers. Bitcoin mining is a race to solve a computational search problem,
with the winner gaining the right to create a new block. Our results inform the strategies
that eventual quantum miners should use, and also indicate that the collision probability—the
probability that two miners find a new block at the same time—would not be too high in the
case of quantum miners. Such collisions are undesirable as they lead to forking of the Bitcoin
blockchain.
1 Introduction
We study the scenario of two or more quantum computers competing to solve a computational task,
which we call a quantum race. This setting presents a different problem to finding the fastest algo-
rithm for a task, as the only goal is to solve the task before the competition. For example, imagine a
search race where Alice and Bob, each armed with identical quantum computers, compete to find a
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marked item in a database. The first person to find the marked item wins $1, with the payout being
split in the case of a tie. The first natural idea is for Alice to run Grover’s algorithm [Gro96], which
can find a marked item in a database of size N with high probability in time O(
√
N). However,
if Alice’s strategy is to run Grover’s algorithm and measure after the specified number of steps to
maximize her success probability, Bob will have an advantage by measuring after running Grover’s
algorithm for a few less steps. Although this way Bob has a slightly lower success probability, he
gains a huge advantage in always answering first. This simple example shows that the optimal
algorithm to solve a problem can be different from the optimal strategy to employ when the goal
is to solve the problem before an opponent.
The scenario of competing algorithms has been studied before in the classical deterministic
setting [IKL+11]. In a classical game, the uncertainty is provided by an unknown probability
distribution over the inputs: depending on what the input is, one algorithmmay perform better than
another. The quantum setting inherently has additional sources of uncertainty, most interestingly
that players do not know if they have solved the problem until they measure their quantum state.
Going back to the search game, in the classical version the players know at every instant if they
have found the marked item or not. This is not the case in the quantum setting, where a player can
only tell if she has found the desired item by measuring her quantum state. Furthermore, if she
measures her state and does not find the marked item, then she must begin the search again from
scratch. In the quantum case there is a natural tension between waiting to measure, and thereby
building up the probability of success upon measuring, and measuring sooner, to answer before
one’s competitors. We study this game theoretic problem to develop strategies for players to use in
quantum races.
One of our main motivations for studying quantum races is to model quantum computers min-
ing the decentralized currency Bitcoin [Nak09]. Mining is the process by which new blocks of
transactions are added to the history of Bitcoin transactions, called the blockchain. The winner of
a race to solve a computational search problem gains the right to add a new block of transactions to
the blockchain, and participants in this race are called miners. Quantum miners could use Grover’s
algorithm to solve the search problem with quadratically fewer search queries than needed clas-
sically. But what should the strategy of quantum miners be when competing against each other?
Question 1. What is the optimal strategy for quantum miners?
Figuring out the optimal strategy for quantum miners is important to analyze the impact of
quantummining on the stability of the Bitcoin protocol. When two miners solve the computational
search problem at (nearly) the same time, the blockchain can fork as it is unclear which new block
is the “correct” history of Bitcoin transactions. Forking is bad for the security of Bitcoin as it can
decrease the cost of attacks [GKW+16], increase the gain from deviating from the intended mining
protocol [EGS14], and generally decreases chain growth and wastes resources. In the classical
case, each search query has the same probability of success. In the quantum case, however, because
of Grover’s algorithm the success probability grows roughly quadratically with the number of
search queries. Does this lead to many quantum miners finding blocks at the same time?
Question 2. What is the probability that two or more quantum miners playing the optimal strategy
find a block at the same time?
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In the next subsections, we describe our model and results in more detail and the impact it has
on these questions.
1.1 The model and results
In a symmetric game all players have the same payoff function. In his original paper defining
a Nash equilibrium, Nash showed that every symmetric multiparty finite game has a symmetric
equilibrium, i.e. one where all players play the same strategy [Nas51]. When all players have
identical quantum computers, a quantum race is naturally a symmetric race, and we describe this
scenario first.
We model a symmetric multiplayer quantum race in the following way. The pure strategies
available to a player are the possible times at which she can measure 1, 2, 3, . . . , K. For each time
t, a player has an algorithm that she can run for t steps and for which the success probability is
pt. Without loss of generality, we assume that these probabilities form an increasing sequence
0 < p1 < p2 < · · · < pK ≤ 1. A general strategy is a probability distribution over the possible
times to measure. The player who succeeds first receives a payoff of 1. In the case of a tie, the
payoff is split amongst all players who succeed first at the same time. Our model can be thought
of as a “one-shot” race, as if a player measures and does not succeed, she does not get a chance to
restart and try again. While a race where players are allowed to repeatedly restart until someone
wins would be more realistic, it becomes much more difficult to analyze due to the proliferation of
possible stategies, and we leave this for future work.
Two-player case We begin explaining our model and results in more detail in the two-player
case. In this case, a game defined by the probabilities p1, . . . , pK can be represented by the payoff
matrix for Alice, given by theK-by-K matrixA, and the payoff matrix for BobB. The (s, t) entry
of A gives Alice’s payoff when she runs an algorithm for time s and Bob plays time t. In the case
of a quantum race, this is defined as
A(s, t) =


ps if s < t
ps(1− ps) + 12p2s if s = t
ps(1− pt) if s > t .
(1)
As the game is symmetric, Bob’s payoff matrix is B = AT.
Our analysis of quantum races begins in Section 3 by analyzing a more tractable variant of the
game we call a stingy quantum race. In a stingy quantum race, there is no payout in the case of
a tie (the game organizer is stingy). A Nash equilibrium of a two-party stingy quantum race has
very strong constraints on its support structure (see Corollary 16). In particular, if (x, y) is a Nash
equilibrium in a two-party stingy quantum race, then the union of the supports of x and y must be
an interval {T, T + 1, . . . , K} that contains the maximum running time K. There are 3 possible
types of Nash equilibria in a two-party stingy quantum race, and we characterize all of them (see
Theorem 22, Theorem 53, and Theorem 59).
One particularly nice type of equilibrium is what we call a coinciding equilibrium. In a coin-
ciding equilibrium, the support of all player’s strategies is the same, but the strategies do not have
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to be identical. This is a more general notion than a symmetric equilibrium where all strategies
are the same. In a coinciding equilibrium for a stingy quantum race, the support of each player’s
strategy is an interval {T, T +1, . . . , K}. This leaves the problem of determining the starting point
T of this interval in a Nash equilibrium. We are able to show that there is always exactly one T
such that there is a Nash equilibrium with support {T, T + 1, . . . , K}.
Theorem 3 (Informal, see Theorem 22). In a two-party stingy quantum race defined by probabili-
ties p1, . . . , pK , there is a unique coinciding Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium all players play
the same strategy, and the support of the strategies is an interval {T ∗, T ∗ + 1, . . . , K}.
We also explicitly find this Nash equilibrium.
This result begs the question: what is this value of T ∗? At what success probability does it
become worthwhile to start measuring? By putting an additional restriction on the probabilities
p1, . . . , pK , we can give quite a precise answer to this question. We say p1, . . . , pK is an ℓ-dense
sequence (see Definition 13) if p1 ≤ ℓK , pK ≥ 1 − ℓK , and pi+1 − pi ≤ ℓK for i = 2, . . . , K − 1.
This is quite a natural restriction that is satisfied for many races. In the quantum search race, where
the pi are the Grover success probabilities, and therefore also in the application to Bitcoin, the
ℓ-density condition is satisfied with ℓ = π/2. In the ℓ-dense case, we can give the following bound
on T ∗.
Theorem 4 (Informal, see Corollary 25 and Corollary 28). Let p1, . . . , pK be an ℓ-dense sequence
with K ≥ 6ℓ. Then the starting point T ∗ of the unique coinciding Nash equilibrium in the stingy
quantum race defined by these probabilities is such that pT ∗ =
√
2− 1 + Θ ( ℓ
K
)
.
Thus it is worthwhile to start measuring once the success probability becomes around
√
2− 1,
and this is largely independent of the actual values of p1, . . . , pK .
In Section 4, we apply our analysis of two-player stingy quantum races to the case of general
quantum races. As the only difference between a stingy quantum race and a quantum race is
the payout on ties, intuitively strategies in these two kinds of races should have similar payoffs
when the probability of ties is small. We follow this intuition and show that when p1, . . . , pK
form an ℓ-dense sequence the probability of a tie is O( ℓ
K
) (see Theorem 27) when players use
the unique coinciding equilibrium from the stingy race, and this strategy is an O( ℓ
K
)-approximate
Nash equilibrium of the corresponding quantum race.
Approximate Nash equilibria are naturally an imperfect lens into true Nash equilibria. The ap-
proximate Nash equilibrium we give would not be a reasonable suggestion for the actual strategies
of quantum players if there were other equilibria with much higher payoff, for example. We show
that this is not the case, and the approximate Nash equilibrium we give is nearly optimal in terms
of payoff amongst all symmetric equilibria.
Theorem 5 (Informal, see Theorem 32 and Theorem 34). Let p1, . . . , pk be an ℓ-dense sequence
with K ≥ 6ℓ. Then the unique coinciding equilibrium of the two-player stingy quantum race
defined by these probabilities is an O( ℓ
K
)-approximate Nash equilibrium in the corresponding
quantum race. Moreover, the payoff achieved by this strategy is within O(
√
ℓ
K
) of the largest
payoff achievable by any symmetric Nash equilibrium.
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To show that the approximate Nash equilibrium we give is nearly optimal in terms of payoff
(Theorem 34), we use the bilinear programming formulation of Nash equilbria due to Mangasarian
and Stone [MS64]. Luckily, in our case the sum of Alice’s and Bob’s payoff matrices A + AT
(from Eq. (1)) turns out to be negative semidefinite. When optimizing over symmetric strategies
this makes the Mangasarian and Stone bilinear program (which is a maximization problem) into a
convex quadratic program. We then use Dorn’s [Dor60] equivalent dual formulation of a convex
quadratic program (see Eq. (37)), which is a minimization problem. We explicitly construct a
feasible solution to this dual minimization problem to upper bound the payoff of any symmetric
Nash equilibrium. Our construction of this dual solution again makes use of our analysis of stingy
quantum races.
Multiplayer case The case of many players is what we are interested in for the application to
Bitcoin. Luckily, we are able to recover analogs of many of the results from the two-player case
in the multiplayer case as well. We start in Section 5 by analyzing n-player stingy quantum races,
and show the following.
Theorem 6 (Informal, see Theorem 46). Let p1, . . . , pK define an n-player stingy quantum race.
This race has a unique coinciding Nash equilibrium, and in this equilibrium all players play the
same strategy. The support of each strategy is an interval {T ∗, T ∗ + 1, . . . , K}.
To show that an n-player stingy quantum race has a unique coinciding Nash equilibrium, our
proof proceeds through a 2-player asymmetric stingy quantum race. In a 2-player asymmetric
race, Alice has probabilities p1, . . . , pK of succeeding after t steps and Bob has a (potentially
different) sequence of probabilities P1, . . . , PK . An asymmetric race models the case where Alice
and Bob have quantum computers of potentially different speeds. We relate the payoff for Alice
in a n-player stingy quantum race to the payoff for Alice in a 2-player quantum race against a
more powerful opponent (see Lemma 45). We can then refer to Lemma 21 in Section 3 which
completely characterizes coinciding equilibria in asymmetric 2-player stingy quantum races. This
gives Theorem 6.
When the sequence p1, . . . , pK is ℓ-dense, we can also say something about the starting point
T ∗ of the n-player coinciding equilibrium, though not as precisely as in the two-party case.
Theorem 7 (Informal, see Theorem 49). Let p1, . . . , pK be an ℓ-dense sequence defining a stingy
n-player quantum race with n ≥ 2. IfK ≥ 4eℓn then the starting point T ∗ of the unique coinciding
equilibrium is such that pT ∗ = Θ(
1
n
).
This means that the more players there are in a game, the earlier one starts to measure in the
unique coinciding equilibrium.
In light of Question 2 we also want to see what the probability of more than one player suc-
ceeding at the same time in this unique coinciding equilibrium. We show the following.
Theorem 8. Let P1, ...., PK define an ℓ-dense stingy n-player quantum race such that 4enℓ ≤ K.
When the players play the coinciding equilibrium of the stingy race, the probability that two or
more players succeed at the same time is at most 8enℓ
K
.
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Finally, as in the two-party case, we show that the unique coinciding equilibrium of a stingy
race is also an approximate Nash equilibrium in the corresponding quantum race, provided the
sequence of probabilities is ℓ-dense.
Theorem 9. Let P1, ...., PK define an ℓ-dense stingy n-player quantum race, n ≥ 2, with 4enℓ ≤
K. If x = (x1, ..., xn) is the coinciding Nash equilibrium for this stingy race, then x is an
8eℓ
K
-
approximate Nash equilibrium of the corresponding quantum race.
1.2 Application to Bitcoin
One application of our study of quantum races is to the decentralized digital currency Bitcoin,
developed in 2008 by Satoshi Nakamoto [Nak09]. Bitcoin transactions are packaged into blocks
and stored in a public ledger called the blockchain. A major obstacle in creating a decentralized
currency is to find a way for all parties to agree on the history of transactions. In Bitcoin, this
is done through Nakamoto consensus: the right to create a new block is decided through proof-
of-work, a contest to solve a computational problem. The winner of this contest has the right to
make a new block of transactions, is given a reward in bitcoin, and then the process repeats itself.
The players competing in this process are called miners. Nakamato consensus remains the primary
means of achieving consensus across all cryptocurrencies, although there are coins using other
consensus mechanisms such as proof-of-stake [KRDO17] or Byzantine agreement [CL99].
The proof-of-work task used in Bitcoin (originally developed in a system called Hashcash
[Bac02]) is essentially a search problem. The problem is to find a value x (called a nonce) such
that h(H ‖ x) ≤ t, where h is a hash function (doubly iterated SHA-256 in the case of Bitcoin),
H is the header of the block of transactions to be processed, and t is a hardness parameter that can
be varied so that the entire network takes 10 minutes to solve this task, on average.
Several works have studied the impact that quantum computers would have on the Bitcoin
protocol [But13, ABL+17, Sat18], both on the mining process we have described above and on
the digital signatures used in Bitcoin to authenticate ownership of coins. We will focus here on the
impact of quantum computers on Bitcoin mining.
As the Bitcoin proof-of-work is a search task, quantum miners could use Grover’s algorithm to
find a nonce x satisfying h(H ‖ x) ≤ t with quadratically fewer evaluations of the hash function
h than is needed by a classical computer 1. The use of Grover’s algorithm creates new issues for
proof-of-work that do not exist in the classical case. Desirable properties of a proof-of-work task
have been studied from an axiomatic point of view by Biryukov and Khovratovich [BK17]. One
property they give is progress-freeness: the probability of a miner solving the proof-of work task
in any moment is independent of previous events. This is achieved for a classical miner in the
Bitcoin proof of work, as every call to the hash function is equally likely to find a good nonce x.
Progress-freeness is not achieved for a quantum miner running Grover’s algorithm, as the success
probability grows roughly quadratically with the amount of time the algorithm is run.
1While this seems to give quantum computers a huge advantage for Bitcoin mining, specialized classical Bitcoin
mining hardware currently can perform14 trillion hashes per second [Bit18] and would outperform a near-term quan-
tum computer with gate speeds of 100MHz [ABL+17]
6
Sattath [Sat18] points out that this gives a way for quantum miners to deviate from the pre-
scribed protocol in order to increase their chance of winning a block. To explain this deviation,
imagine a simplified case where the proof-of-work is to find a unique marked item in a database of
size N . Say that Alice, a quantum miner, receives a new block from the network which was found
by Bob. When Alice receives this block she will be in the middle of running Grover’s algorithm
to find the marked item herself. The prescribed protocol says that she should immediately halt this
run of Grover’s algorithm and begin working on a new search problem by mining on top of Bob’s
new block. However, if Alice has run Grover algorithm for c
√
N steps, for a constant c, she will
have already built up a constant probability of finding the marked item upon measuring. From the
point of view of maximizing her payoff, there is no harm in just measuring to see if she finds the
marked item. If Alice gets lucky and indeed finds the marked item, then she can broadcast her
new block to the network. Depending on her connectivity to the network, some other miners may
receive Alice’s block before Bob’s, and there is some probability that Alice’s new block eventually
becomes the block accepted by the network rather than Bob’s, meaning that Alice will receive the
bitcoin reward. Note that this does not happen in the classical case, where after Alice receives
Bob’s block she would still just have probability 1/N to find the marked item with each additional
search query. In this case it makes sense to immediately start mining on top of the new block.
Luckily, Sattath also provides an easy fix for the Bitcoin protocol to remedy this problem.
Without going into the technical details, this fix essentially forces miners to commit to how long
they will run Grover’s algorithm before they begin. Thus if Alice commits to running Grover’s al-
gorithm for time
√
N/100, yet receives Bob’s block after time
√
N/200, if she tries to immediately
measure and publish her own block, the network will reject it because of the timing discrepancy.
This fix fits in very well with our model of quantum races, as a strategy is exactly a probability
distribution over choices of times to measure.
The quantum race that captures the case of Bitcoin mining is what we call the Grover race
(see Definition 12). In this race, the success probability pt is given by the success probability of
t-iterations of Grover’s algorithm 2. This race is an ℓ-dense race for ℓ = π/2. The size of the search
space, and thus the maximum number of iterations K to run Grover’s algorithm, is determined by
the difficulty setting of the Bitcoin protocol. Currently the difficulty (as of September 7, 2018)
is approximately 7 · 1012, which, by Bitcoin’s definition of difficulty, means that the network has
to do roughly 232 · 7 · 1012 many hashes to succeed, in expectation. This leads to a value of K
of approximately 1011. Thus for this application ℓ
K
is very small, and Theorem 9 implies that the
unique coinciding equilibrium for the stingy Grover race is an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium in
the Grover race for ǫ ≤ 3 · 10−10. This gives a reasonable answer to Question 1 for what a good
strategy would be for quantum miners, and moreover has the desirable property that all miners run
the same algorithm. By Theorem 8, when there are n miners running this strategy the probability
of a tie is at most 3n · 10−10. This gives an answer to Question 2, that quantum mining is not likely
to produce a high forking rate and thereby destabilize the Bitcoin protocol.
2It is known that t queries of Grover’s algorithm maximizes the probability of success in a search problem over all
t-query quantum algorithms [DH08].
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2 Preliminaries
We use e ≈ 2.71828 for Euler’s number. For ease of reference, we state some simple inequalities
we will make use of here:
1
1− x ≤ 1 + 2x for 0 ≤ x ≤
1
2
, (2)
1
a+ x
≥ 1
a
− x
a2
for a > 0 and x > −a , (3)
√
a+ x ≤ √a + x
2
√
a
for a > 0 and x ≥ −a , (4)
√
a− x ≤ √a− x
2
√
a
− x
2
8a3/2
for a > 0 and 0 ≤ x ≤ a . (5)
For a probability 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, we set p¯ = 1− p. For a natural number n, we let [n] = {1, ..., n}.
We let ∆n = {x ∈ Rn : x ≥ 0,
∑n
i=1 xi = 1} be the probability simplex. For x ∈ ∆n we let
sup(x) = {i ∈ [n] : xi > 0} be the support of x.
By a vector we mean a column vector, so an n-dimensional vector is an n-by-1 matrix. We
use 0 for the all zeros vector and 1 for the all ones vector, where the dimension is implied from
the context. The transpose of a matrix M is denoted by MT. A 2-player game between players
Alice and Bob is specified by two m × n real matrices A and B. We call A the payoff matrix of
Alice, and B the payoff matrix of Bob. We sometimes refer to Alice as the row player and to Bob
as the column player. A pure strategy of Alice is an element of [m], and a pure strategy of Bob
is an element of [n]. We can think of pure strategies of the players as their choice of a row and
of a column of an m × n matrix, respectively. When Alice chooses i and Bob chooses j, their
respective payoffs are aij and bij . A mixed strategy of the row player is a probability distribution
x over [m] written as an m-vector. Similarly, a mixed strategy of the column player is an n-vector
y describing a probability distribution over columns. The support of a mixed strategy is the set of
pure strategies (indices) that have positive probabilities. We denote the support of a mixed strategy
z by sup(z). When Alice plays the mixed strategy x and Bob plays the mixed strategy y, their
expected payoffs are xTAy and xTBy, respectively. When Alice uses the pure strategy i against y,
her payoff is eTi Ay, where ei denotes the i
th standard basis vector. The purpose of both players in
the game is to maximize their respective expected payoffs.
A pure strategy i of Alice is a best response to the mixed strategy y of Bob if it maximizes her
payoff against y. The set of best responses of Alice against y is denoted by br(y). A mixed strategy
x of Alice is a best response to the mixed strategy y of Bob if it contains only best responses, that
is sup(x) ⊆ br(y). Analogous definitions hold with the roles of the players exchanged. A pair of
mixed strategies (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium if they are best responses to each other. It is quite
easy to see that (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium exactly when the strategies x and y maximize, for both
players, their expected payoff against the strategy of the other player.
Definition 10 (quantum race). A 2-player quantum race is specified by two sequences of increas-
ing probabilities 0 < p1 < p2 < · · · < pK ≤ 1, and 0 < P1 < P2 < · · · < PK ≤ 1 for some
integer K ≥ 2. The set of pure strategies of both players is [K]. The K ×K payoff matrix A of
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Alice is defined as
A(i, j) =


pi if i < j,
piP¯j +
1
2
piPi if i = j,
piP¯j otherwise.
The payoff matrix B is defined as
B(i, j) =


Pj if j < i,
Pj p¯i +
1
2
piPi if i = j,
Pj p¯i otherwise.
If pi = Pi for all i = 1, . . . , K then we call the game a symmetric quantum race. Note that in this
case B = AT.
In our study of quantum races, a key role will be played by an auxiliary game that is easier to
analyze called a stingy quantum race. A stingy quantum race differs from a quantum race only in
that no payout is given in the case of a tie.
Definition 11 (stingy quantum race). A 2-player stingy quantum race is specified by two sequences
of increasing probabilities 0 < p1 < p2 < · · · < pK ≤ 1, and 0 < P1 < P2 < · · · < PK ≤ 1 for
some integer K ≥ 2. The set of pure strategies of both players is [K]. The K ×K payoff matrix
A0 of Alice is defined as
A0(i, j) =
{
pi if i < j,
piP¯j otherwise.
The payoff matrix of Bob B0 is defined as
B0(i, j) =
{
Pj if j < i,
Pj p¯i otherwise.
If pi = Pi for all i = 1, . . . , K then we call the game a symmetric stingy quantum race. Note that
in this case B0 = A
T
0 .
The main specific quantum race we will be interested in is the Grover race. This results from
two players competing to find a marked item in a database and playing by running Grover’s algo-
rithm for a certain amount of time and then measuring. Formally, the race is defined as follows.
Definition 12 (Grover race). We define the (stingy) Grover race on N items as the symmetric
(stingy) quantum race withK =
⌈
π
4
√
N − 3/2
⌉
and
pt = sin
2
(
2(t+ 1/2) arcsin
(
1√
N
))
,
for 1 ≤ t ≤ K.
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Here pt is the success probability of Grover’s algorithm of finding a unique marked item in a
database of N items. It is known that pt is the highest success probability for finding a marked
item for any quantum algorithm making t many calls to the database [DH08].
The Grover race has many nice properties, and we will abstract out one of them here. This
allows us to show results for a general class of quantum races, rather than just the Grover race.
Definition 13 (dense race). Let p1 < p2 < · · · < pK ≤ 1. We call the sequence (p1, . . . , pK)
ℓ-dense if p1 ≤ ℓK , pK ≥ 1− ℓK , and pi+1−pi ≤ ℓK for all i = 1, . . . , K−1. For a dense sequence
(p1, . . . , pK) will similarly call the symmetric (stingy) quantum race defined by this sequence a
symmetric (stingy) ℓ-dense quantum race.
The (stingy) Grover race is an ℓ-dense race with ℓ = π/2.
3 Two-player stingy quantum races
We will first analyze Nash equilibria in stingy quantum races. We can show several structural
properties about the support of Nash equilibria in stingy quantum races that make them easier to
analyze than quantum races. After our analysis in this section, we will bootstrap our knowledge
of Nash equilibria in stingy quantum races to find an approximate Nash equilibrium for quantum
races.
Consider a stingy quantum race given by the probabilities 0 < p1 < p2 < · · · < pK ≤ 1
and 0 < P1 < P2 < · · · < PK , and let y be a mixed strategy of Bob. For t ≤ K, we let
sup≤t(y) = {j ∈ sup(y) : j ≤ t} be the set of times played by Bob that are at most t, and
similarly, we let sup>t(y) = {j ∈ sup(y) : j > t} be the set of times played by Bob that are
greater than t. Observe that when Alice plays the pure strategy t against y, her payoff is
eTt Ay = pt

 ∑
j∈sup≤t(y)
yjP¯j +
∑
j∈sup>t(y)
yj

 .
Claim 14. Let (x, y) be a Nash equilibrium of a 2-player stingy quantum race. If t1 ∈ sup(x) then
there does not exist t2 > t1 with sup≤t1(y) = sup≤t2(y).
Proof. Say that the game is defined by probabilities 0 < p1 < p2 < · · · < pK ≤ 1 and 0 < P1 <
P2 < · · · < Pk If sup≤t1(y) = sup≤t2(y) then
eTt2Ay =
pt2
pt1
eTt1Ay.
As pt1 < pt2 , the payoff for playing t2 is strictly larger than that for playing t1. Therefore t1 is not
a best response for y, in contradiction with the definition of a Nash equilibrium.
This claim implies that the support structure of Nash equilibria in stingy quantum races is
relatively simple. We first make the following definition.
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Definition 15. A pair of strategies (x, y) is called coinciding if sup(x) = sup(y). A pair of
strategies (x, y) is called alternating if there exists 1 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ K such that the support of one
player is {t1, t1 + 2, . . . , t2 − 1} and the support of the other is sup(y) = {t1 + 1, t1 + 3, . . . , t2}.
A pair of strategies (x, y) is called (t1, c, t2)-alternating-coinciding if there are natural numbers
1 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ K and t1 + 2 ≤ c ≤ t2 such that the support of one player is {t1, t1 + 2, . . . , c −
2, c, c + 1, c + 2, . . . , t2} and the support of the other is sup(y) = {t1 + 1, t1 + 3, . . . , c − 3, c −
1, c, c+ 1, c+ 2, . . . , t2}.
Corollary 16. Let (x, y) be a Nash equilibrium of a stingy quantum race specified by probabilities
0 < p1 < p2 < · · · < pK ≤ 1 and 0 < P1 < P2 < · · · < Pk. Then there is some 1 ≤ T ≤ K such
that
• sup(x) ∪ sup(y) = [T,K] ,
• (x, y) is either coinciding, alternating, or alternating-coinciding.
Proof. From Claim 14 we can easily derive the following two statements:
• sup(x) ∪ sup(y) is an interval containing the time with maximum success probability,
• For every t1, t2 ∈ sup(x) there must be t ∈ sup(y) with t1 < t ≤ t2.
These statements immediately imply the claim.
We now study the particularly simple coinciding equilibria. In Appendix A.1 we give a full
characterization of all Nash equilibria in a symmetric stingy quantum race.
3.1 Unique coinciding equilibrium
We first look for Nash equilibria where the mixed strategies of Alice and Bob have the same
support. If the number of strategies is K, we know by Corollary 16 that this support must be a set
{T, T + 1, . . . , K}, for some 1 ≤ T ≤ K.
Lemma 17. Consider a stingy quantum race defined by 0 < p1 < . . . < pK ≤ 1 and 0 < P1 <
P2 < · · · < Pk. Let x, y ∈ RK . Then (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium for this game with support
{T, T + 1, . . . , K}, for some 1 ≤ T ≤ K, if and only if x and y satisfy the following system of
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equations and inequalities.
eTt Ay = e
T
TAy, for T < t ≤ K , (6)
eTT−1Ay ≤ eTTAy, (7)
yt = 0 for 0 < t < T , (8)
yt > 0 for T ≤ t ≤ K , (9)
K∑
t=T
yt = 1 (10)
xTBet = x
TBeT , for T < t ≤ K , (11)
xTBeT−1 ≤ xTBeT , (12)
xt = 0 for 0 < t < T , (13)
xt > 0 for T ≤ t ≤ K , (14)
K∑
t=T
xt = 1 . (15)
Proof. Eq. (8)–(10) and (13)–(15) express that x and y are probability distributions with support
{T, T + 1, . . . , K}. The other conditions for a Nash equilibrium are that all strategies in the
support of x are best responses against y and vice versa. That all strategies in the support of x are
best responses against y means
eTt Ay = e
T
TAy, for T < t ≤ K ,
eTt−1Ay ≤ eTt Ay, for 1 ≤ t < T
The first equation here is exactly Eq. (6). The inequality here is implied by Eq. (7). This is because
for t < T − 1
eTt Ay =
pt
pT−1
eTT−1Ay
as sup≤T−1(y) = sup≤t(y). A similar argument show that Eq. (11)–(12) show that all strategies in
the support of y are best responses against x.
When PK = 1, then Alice has zero payoff on playing time K. Thus as long as K ≥ 2, when
PK = 1 there is no coinciding Nash equilibrium (x, y) where sup(x) = sup(y) = {K}. A similar
argument applies when pK = 1. We will therefore exclude the case T = K and either pK = 1 or
PK = 1 for the next definition and Lemma 19.
Definition 18. We define the values qAT , q
B
T , for T = 2, . . . , K, and r
A
T , r
B
T , z
A
T , z
B
T , for T =
1, . . . , K − 1. The values zAK , rAK are not defined when T = K, pK = 1 and zBK , rBK are not
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defined when T = K,PK = 1.
qAi =
1
pi
(
1
Pi−1
− 1
Pi
)
(16)
qBi =
1
Pi
(
1
pi−1
− 1
pi
)
(17)
rAT =
1
p¯T
(
1
PK
−
K∑
i=T+1
p¯iq
A
i
)
(18)
rBT =
1
P¯T
(
1
pK
−
K∑
i=T+1
P¯iq
B
i
)
(19)
zAT = r
A
T +
K∑
i=T+1
qAi (20)
zBT = r
B
T +
K∑
i=T+1
qBi (21)
Lemma 19. For every 1 ≤ T ≤ K − 1, and the case T = K and PK 6= 1, the system of linear
equations composed of the Eq. (6), (8) and (10) of Lemma 17 has a unique solution given by
yt =


rBT /z
B
T if t = T,
qBt /z
B
T if T < t ≤ K,
0 otherwise .
Proof. For convenience, we drop the normalization condition
∑K
t=T yt = 1 and instead scale y
such that the expected payoff of a best response is 1. That is, we replace Eq. (10) by Eq. (22):
eTTAy = 1. (22)
Clearly the solutions of Eq. (6),(8),(10) and the solutions of Eq. (6),(8),(22) differ only by a con-
stant multiplicative factor, and from a solution of the latter system a solution of the former one can
be obtained by dividing it coordinate-wise by
∑K
t=T yt.
We first want to find the solutions of Eq. (6) and (22). Together, they can be expressed in matrix
form as: 

pT P¯T pT pT · · · pT
pT+1P¯T pT+1P¯T+1 pT+1 · · · pT+1
pT+2P¯T pT+2P¯T+1 pT+2P¯T+2 · · · pT+2
...
. . .
...
pK P¯T pK p¯T+1 pKP¯T+2 · · · pK P¯K




yT
yT+1
yT+2
...
yK

 =


1
1
1
...
1

 . (23)
13
We can simplify the above system of linear equations as follows:

P¯T 1 1 · · · 1
P¯T P¯T+1 1 · · · 1
P¯T P¯T+1 P¯T+2 · · · 1
...
. . .
...
P¯T P¯T+1 P¯T+2 · · · P¯K




yT
yT+1
yT+2
...
yK

 =


1/pT
1/pT+1
1/pT+2
...
1/pK

 .
Now for each row before the last we subtract from it the next row, which gives:

0 PT+1 0 · · · 0
0 0 PT+2 · · · 0
0 0 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
P¯T P¯T+1 P¯T+2 · · · P¯K




yT
yT+1
yT+2
...
yK

 =


1/pT − 1/pT+1
1/pT+1 − 1/pT+2
1/pT+2 − 1/pT+3
...
1/pK

 .
From this we can see that, for every 1 ≤ T ≤ K, Eq. (23) has a unique solution, given by yT = rBT ,
and yt = q
B
t , for T < t ≤ K.
Definition 20. Define T ∗A (respectively T
∗
B) as the smallest integer 1 ≤ T ≤ K such that rAT > 0
(respectively rBT > 0). When T
∗
A = T
∗
B we denote their common value as T
∗.
This definition makes sense as in the case pK = 1 (when r
A
K is not defined) we see that r
A
K−1 >
0 and otherwise rAK =
1
p¯KPK
> 0. A similar argument applies for rBK .
The following theorem characterizes the coinciding Nash equilibria in a stingy quantum race.
Lemma 21. Eq. (6)–(10) have a solution if and only if T = T ∗B . In the case T = T
∗
B , the solution
is unique and is given by
yt =
{
rBT ∗
B
/zBT ∗
B
if t = T ∗B,
qBt /z
B
T ∗
B
if T ∗B < t ≤ K.
Proof. If K ≥ 2 and PK = 1 then eTKAeK = 0 and eTK−1AeK > 0. Thus Eq. (6)–(10) do not have
a solution with sup(y) = {K} in this case. We therefore exclude the case T = K and pK = 1
from the discussion below.
By Lemma 19 we know that for every 1 ≤ T ≤ K, there exists a unique solution to Eq. (6), (8)
and (10). For a fixed T , the only possible solution is given by Lemma 19. We now examine for
which T is it true that the this solution y also satisfies Eq. (7) and (9). First we claim that Eq. (9)
is satisfied if and only if T ≥ T ∗B . To see that, observe that as the pt form an increasing sequence,
we have qBt > 0, for all 2 ≤ t ≤ K. Therefore Eq. (9) is satisfied if and only if rBT > 0 which,
because rBT is an increasing function of T , holds if and only if T ≥ T ∗B .
We now turn to Eq. (7), and we claim that it is satisfied if and only if T ≤ T ∗B . Substituting in
the values of y from Lemma 19, we can express Eq. (7) as
pT−1
(
rBT +
K∑
i=T+1
qBi
)
≤ 1. (24)
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Let us also observe that the first row of Eq. (23) applied with the start of the interval at T − 1 gives
pT−1
(
P¯T−1rBT−1 +
K∑
i=T
qBi
)
= 1, (25)
for T = 2, . . . , K.
Comparing Eq. (24) and (25), we see that Eq. (7) holds if and only if
rBT ≤ P¯T−1rBT−1 + qBT . (26)
Note that for every 2 ≤ T ≤ K, we have
P¯T−1rBT−1 = P¯T (r
B
T − qBT ) . (27)
Replacing P¯T−1rBT−1 by P¯T (r
B
T − qBT ) in the right hand side of Eq. (26), we get that Eq. (7) is
equivalent to
rBT ≤ P¯T rBT + PTqBT . (28)
The right hand side of Eq. (28) is a convex combination of rBT and q
B
T , therefore it is at least rT if
and only if
rBT − qBT ≤ 0. (29)
Looking again at Eq. (27), since both P¯T−1 and P¯T are positive, we can deduce that Eq. (29), and
therefore also Eq. (7) holds exactly when
rBT−1 ≤ 0. (30)
By the definition of T ∗B , and the fact that r
B
T is an increasing function of T , Eq. (30) holds when
T ≤ T ∗B. Thus we conclude that Eq. (6)–(10) are satisfied if and only if T = T ∗B , in which case the
solution is given as in Lemma 19.
The following theorem characterizes the coinciding Nash equilibria in a stingy quantum race.
Theorem 22. A stingy quantum race defined by probabilities 0 < p1 < . . . < pK ≤ 1 and
0 < P1 < . . . < PK ≤ 1 has a coinciding Nash equilibrium if and only if T ∗A = T ∗B . In this case,
letting T ∗ = T ∗A = T
∗
B there is a unique coinciding equilibrium given by
xt =
{
rAT ∗/z
A
T ∗ if t = T
∗,
qAt /z
A
T ∗ if T
∗ < t ≤ K , yt =
{
rBT ∗/z
B
T ∗ if t = T
∗,
qBt /z
B
T ∗ if T
∗ < t ≤ K .
In particular, when pi = Pi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ K then (x, x) is the unique coinciding Nash equilib-
rium.
Proof. By Lemma 17 a coinciding Nash equilibrium (x, y) supported on {T, T + 1, . . . , K} must
satisfy Eq. (6)–(15). By Lemma 21, Eq. (6)–(10) are satisfied if and only if T = T ∗B and y is given
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as in the Lemma. We can also apply Lemma 21 to (the transpose of) Eq. (11)–(15) to see that they
have a solution if and only if T = T ∗A and x is given by
xt =


rAT ∗
A
/zAT ∗
A
if t = T ∗A,
qAt /z
A
T ∗
A
if T ∗A < t ≤ K,
0 otherwise.
As x and y must have the same support in a coinciding Nash equilibrium, there can only exist a
coinciding Nash equilibrium if T ∗A = T
∗
B .
When pi = Pi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ K then clearly rAT = rBT and qAi = qBi and it will always be
the case that T ∗A = T
∗
B . Thus there will always exist a Nash equilibrium in this case, given by the
unique solution to Eq. (6)–(15).
3.2 Payoff and collision probability
In this section we will explore the consequences of the coinciding Nash equilibrium we have found
for the payoff of the game and for the probability that the two players win at the same time, the
collision probability. For these results, we will only consider the symmetric case when there is
always a unique symmetric equilibrium whose support begins at T ∗ = T ∗A = T
∗
B . Note that the
payoff for each player with this strategy is 1
zT∗
. Since a player receives payoff 1 upon winning, 1
zT∗
is also exactly the each player’s winning probability.
To investigate the collision probability, we will also make the following definitions.
Definition 23 (Unnormalized collision probability). Define
σ(T ) = p2T r
2
T +
K∑
i=T+1
p2i q
2
i .
With this definition, 1
z2
T∗
σ(T ∗) is the collision probability we are interested in.
First we analyze the payoff in a symmetric stingy quantum race.
Theorem 24. Let p1 < p2 < · · · < pK define a stingy symmetric quantum race. Then
zT ∗ = 1 +
√
1 + 1
p2
K
+ σ(T ∗) .
In particular,
1
zT ∗
≤
√
2− 1 .
Proof. We look at all different possible outcomes of the race: Alice wins, Bob wins, or no one
wins. There are two different ways in which no one wins: Alice and Bob both succeed at the same
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time, or, no one succeeds. The probability that Alice wins is 1/zT ∗ , and the same for Bob. Thus
we have
1 =
2
zT ∗
+
σ(T ∗)
z2T ∗
+
(
1
z∗T
(
p¯T ∗rT ∗ +
K∑
i=T ∗+1
p¯iqi
))2
=
2
zT ∗
+
σ(T ∗)
z2T ∗
+
(
1
pKzT ∗
)2
.
Taking the positive root gives
zT ∗ = 1 +
√
1 + 1
p2
K
+ σ(T ∗) .
The “in particular” statement follows by noting zT ∗ ≥ 1 +
√
2.
Corollary 25. If T ∗ ≥ 2 then
pT ∗−1 ≤
√
2− 1 .
Proof. As can be seen from Bob playing time T ∗−1, we have pT ∗−1zT ∗ ≤ 1, thus pT ∗−1 ≤
√
2−1
by Theorem 24.
Although Theorem 24 gives an exact expression for the payoff, we would like to get a general
lower bound on the payoff. This requires showing an upper bound on the collision probability.
Showing an upper bound on the collision probability is also important for the application to Bitcoin,
to estimate the forking probability amongst quantum miners.
The first step to upper bounding the collision probability is to get a rough lower bound on pT ∗ .
This is our initial bootstrap, which will then let us upper bound the collision probability and then
in turn get a sharper lower bound on pT ∗ in Corollary 28. For these results we restrict to ℓ-dense
stingy quantum races.
Lemma 26. Let p1, . . . , pK define an ℓ-dense symmetric stingy quantum race. If K ≥ 6ℓ then
pT ∗ >
5
21
. In particular, T ∗ ≥ 2.
Proof. As rT ∗ > 0 we have
1
pK
>
K∑
i=T ∗+1
p¯iqi
=
K∑
i=T ∗+1
(
1
pi
− 1
)(
1
pi−1
− 1
pi
)
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Let L = maxT {T : pT ≤ 1/2}. By assumption of an ℓ-dense quantum race, we have pL ≥ 12 − ℓK .
Whenever pi ≤ 1/2 we have (1/pi − 1) ≥ 1, thus
1
pK
>
L∑
i=T ∗+1
1
pi−1
− 1
pi
=
1
pT ∗
− 1
pL
≥ 1
pT ∗
− 3
where for the last inequality we have used 1
pL
≤ 3 by the assumption K ≥ 6ℓ. This then implies
that 1
pT∗
≤ 6
5
+ 3, again using the fact thatK ≥ 6ℓ and so pK ≥ 56 .
The “in particular” holds since p1 ≤ 1/6 by the assumption of ℓ-density and that K ≥ 6ℓ, and
1/6 < 5/21.
Theorem 27. Let p1, . . . , pK define an ℓ-dense symmetric stingy quantum race. If K ≥ 6ℓ then
σ(T ∗)
z2T ∗
≤ 6ℓ
K
and σ(T ∗) ≤ 196ℓ
K
.
Proof. We will actually prove a more general statement: for any probability distribution v on [K]
it holds that
1
zT ∗
(
vT ∗p
2
T ∗rT ∗ +
K∑
i=T ∗+1
vip
2
i qi
)
≤ 6ℓ
K
. (31)
Applying this with the distribution vT ∗ =
rT∗
zT∗
and vT =
qT
zT∗
for T ∗ + 1 ≤ T ≤ K gives the
first inequality. We discuss how to derive the second inequality of the Theorem after the proof of
Eq. (31).
Now we turn to the proof of Eq. (31). First, note that T ∗ ≥ 2 by Lemma 26 and thus it makes
sense to talk about T ∗ − 1. As rT ∗ ≤ qT ∗ we have:
1
zT ∗
(
vT ∗p
2
T ∗rT ∗ +
K∑
i=T ∗+1
vip
2
i qi
)
≤ 1
zT ∗
K∑
i=T ∗
vip
2
i qi
=
1
zT ∗
K∑
i=T ∗
vipi
(
1
pi−1
− 1
pi
)
=
1
zT ∗
K∑
i=T ∗
vi
(
pi − pi−1
pi−1
)
≤ ℓ
KzT ∗
K∑
i=T ∗
vi
(
1
pi−1
)
≤ ℓ
KzT ∗
1
pT ∗−1
,
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since v is a probability distribution. Now note that pT ∗−1 ≥ 521 − 16 ≥ 114 by Lemma 26 and the
assumption ℓ
K
≤ 1
6
. Eq. (31) now follows from the upper bound 1
zT∗
≤ √2− 1 from Theorem 24.
To see the second inequality, note
σ(T ∗) ≤ ℓ
K
zT ∗
pT ∗−1
≤ ℓ
K
1
p2T ∗−1
≤ 196ℓ
K
.
Now that we have an upper bound on the collision probability, we obtain the following corollary
to Theorem 24.
Corollary 28. Let p1, . . . , pK define an ℓ-dense symmetric stingy quantum race. Let τ =
50
√
2ℓ
K
. If
K ≥ 6ℓ then
zT ∗ ≤
√
2 + 1 + τ,
1
zT ∗
≥
√
2− 1− τ(
√
2− 1)2, pT ∗ ≥
√
2− 1− τ(
√
2− 1)2 .
Proof. By Theorem 24 we have
zT ∗ = 1 +
√
1 +
1
p2K
+ σ(T ∗)
≤ 1 +
√
1 +
K2
(K − ℓ)2 +
196ℓ
K
≤ 1 +
√
2 +
200ℓ
K
,
as K
2
(K−ℓ)2 ≤ 1 + 4ℓK by Eq. (2) (using the assumption that ℓK ≤ 16). Continuing by applying Eq. (4)
we have
zT ∗ ≤
√
2 + 1 +
50
√
2ℓ
K
,
giving the first inequality of the Corollary. The second inequality of the Corollary follows by
applying Eq. (3) to the first inequality.
The third inequality of the Corollary follows from the second inequality from the observation
that pT ∗ ≥ 1zT∗ . This is because
1
zT ∗
=
pT ∗
zT ∗
(
rT ∗ p¯T ∗ +
K∑
t=T ∗+1
qt
)
≤ pT ∗
zT ∗
(
rT ∗ +
K∑
t=T ∗+1
qt
)
= pT ∗ .
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4 Two-player quantum races
In this section, we bootstrap our results about symmetric stingy quantum races to analyze symmet-
ric quantum races. Our main results are two-fold.
1. The unique coinciding Nash equilibrium in an ℓ-dense symmetric stingy quantum race is an
approximate Nash equilibrium in the corresponding quantum race.
2. The approximate Nash equilibrium from (1) achieves a payoff which is nearly optimal among
all symmetric Nash equilibria in a symmetric quantum race.
The intuition for item (1) is clear. The only difference between a stingy quantum race and a
quantum race is the payoff on ties. For the unique coinciding Nash equilibrium we have shown
that the collision probability is O(ℓ/K), thus the change in payoff on ties will make only a small
change to the payoffs under this strategy.
For item (2), we use the quadratic programming characterization of Nash equilibria [MS64].
Consider a game (A,B) where A,B arem-by-n matrices. The program
maximize
x∈∆m,y∈∆n,α,β∈R
xT (A+B)y − α− β
subject to Ay ≤ α1,
BTx ≤ β1,
(32)
has an optimal value of 0, and any (x, y) attaining the value 0 is a Nash equilibrium. In the case
of a symmetric quantum race (A,AT ), when we restrict to symmetric strategies (x, x) the objec-
tive function in Eq. (32) becomes negative definite plus linear, making this a standard quadratic
program. We then use the tight dual formulation of a quadratic program [Dor60] to give an upper
bound on the payoff of any symmetric Nash equilibrium, by explicitly constructing solutions to
the dual problem. This allows us to show that the payoff of the unique coinciding equilibrium
in a stingy race achieves a payoff which is within O(
√
ℓ/K) of optimal amongst all symmetric
equilibria in the corresponding quantum race.
We now proceed to show these two results.
4.1 Approximate Nash equilibrium
Definition 29. A two-player game described by payoff matrices (A,B) is said to have an ǫ-
approximate Nash equilibrium (p, q), for ǫ ≥ 0, if the following two conditions hold
pTAq ≥ vTAq − ǫ for all v ∈ ∆m (33)
pTBq ≥ pTBu− ǫ for all u ∈ ∆n . (34)
Definition 30. A two-player game described by payoff matrices (A,B) is said to have an ǫ-well
supported Nash equilibrium (p, q), for ǫ ≥ 0 if
eTi Aq ≥ eTj Aq − ǫ for all i ∈ sup(p) and j ∈ [m]
pTBei ≥ pTBej − ǫ for all i ∈ sup(q) and j ∈ [n] .
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Note that an ǫ-well supported Nash equilibrium is also an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium, but
the reverse does not hold.
Before showing that the unique coinciding equilibrium in an ℓ-dense symmetric stingy quantum
race is a well supported equilibrium in the corresponding ℓ-dense symmetric quantum race, we
need the following claim.
Claim 31. Let p1, . . . , pK be an ℓ-dense sequence such thatK ≥ 6ℓ. Then for all T ∗ ≤ i, j ≤ K∣∣∣∣ pipi−1 −
pj
pj−1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 14ℓK .
Proof. Lemma 26 along with the ℓ dense condition gives us a lower bound on pT ∗−1 ≥ 521− 16 = 114 .
Now note that for all T ∗ ≤ i ≤ K, we have
1 ≤ pi
pi−1
≤ 1 + ℓ
Kpi−1
≤ 1 + ℓ
KpT ∗−1
≤ 1 + 14ℓ
K
,
thus proving the claim.
Theorem 32. Let p1, . . . , pK be an ℓ-dense sequence defining the symmetric stingy quantum race
(A0, A
T
0 ) and the symmetric quantum race (A,A
T ). Let (x, x) be the unique coinciding Nash
equilibrium for the stingy quantum race (A0, A
T
0 ) given by Theorem 22. Then (x, x) is a
7(
√
2−1)ℓ
K
-
well supported Nash equilibrium in the quantum race (A,AT ).
Proof. To show that (x, x) is an ǫ-well supported Nash equilibrium in the quantum race (A,AT ) it
suffices to show that eTi Ax ≥ eTj Ax− ǫ for all T ∗ ≤ i ≤ K and j ∈ [K].
Note that
eTi A0x =
{
1
zT∗
if T ∗ ≤ i ≤ K
pi if i < T
∗ . (35)
As A = A0 +
1
2
diag(p21, . . . , p
2
K) this means
eTi Ax =
{
1
zT∗
+ 1
2
p2ixi if T
∗ ≤ i ≤ K
pi if i < T
∗ . (36)
For T ∗ ≤ i ≤ K and j < T ∗ we have eTi Ax ≥ eTi A0x ≥ eTj A0x = eTj Ax.
Now we show that for T ∗ ≤ i, j ≤ K we have eTi Ax ≥ eTj Ax − 7(
√
2−1)ℓ
zT∗K
. First we consider
the case where T ∗ < i ≤ K and T ∗ ≤ j ≤ K. In this case
eTi Ax− eTj Ax =
1
2
(
p2ixi − p2jxj
)
≥ 1
2z∗T
(
pi
pi−1
− pj
pj−1
)
≥ −7(
√
2− 1)ℓ
K
,
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by Claim 31 along with Theorem 24. The second line holds with equality except for the case
j = T ∗, where we have used the fact that qT ∗ ≥ rT ∗ .
Finally, consider the case where i = T ∗ and T ∗ < j ≤ K. Then
eTT ∗Ax− eTj Ax =
1
2zT ∗
(
p2T ∗rT ∗ −
pj
pj−1
+ 1
)
≥ 1
2zT ∗
(
1− pj
pj−1
)
≥ −7(
√
2− 1)ℓ
K
.
4.2 Upper bound on payoff
Let (x, x) be the unique coinciding Nash equilibrium in an ℓ-dense symmetric stingy quantum
race (A0, A
T
0 ). We have just shown that (x, x) is a
7(
√
2−1)ℓ
K
-well supported Nash equilibrium in
the corresponding quantum race (A,AT). By Corollary 28, (x, x) achieves payoff at least
√
2 −
1 − 50√2(√2 − 1)2 ℓ
K
in the game (A,AT). In this section, we show that this payoff is within
O(
√
ℓ/K) of optimal among all symmetric strategies (y, y) for the game (A,AT).
Our starting point is to use the program in Eq. (32) to provide a means to upper bound the value
of any symmetric equilibrium.
Lemma 33. Let (A,AT ) be a symmetric game and define for c ≥ 0
γA(c) = maximize
x
1
2
xT (A + AT )x
subject to Ax ≤ c1,
1
Tx = 1, x ≥ 0.
For all c0, such that γA(c) < c for all c ≥ c0, the payoff of any symmetric Nash equilibrium in the
game (A,AT) is less than c0.
Proof. We show the contrapositive. Suppose there is a symmetric Nash equilibrium (x, x) with
payoff c ≥ c0. Then (x, x, c, c) is a feasible solution to the program in Eq. (32) with objective
value 0. Thus Ax ≤ c and 1
2
xT(A+ AT)x = c.
This is the approach we take to upper bounding the payoff of symmetric Nash equilibria in a
quantum race.
Theorem 34. Let p1, . . . , pK be an ℓ-dense sequence with K ≥ 6ℓ. Then any symmetric Nash
equilibrium (x, x) in the two-player quantum race defined by p1, . . . , pK has payoff at most
√
2 −
1 + 5
√
ℓ
K
.
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Proof. Let (A,AT) be the payoff matrices of a two-player quantum race defined by p1, . . . , pK .
We will show that γA(c) < c for all c >
√
2− 1 + 5
√
ℓ
K
. By Lemma 33 this proves the theorem.
In the case of a quantum race A+AT = p1T+1pT−ppT. This means that over the probability
simplex, the quadratic form xT(A+AT)x = −xT(ppT)x+ 2pTx is a negative-definite plus linear
function. In this case, γA(c) is in the standard form of a quadratic program and has a dual program
with matching value [Dor60].
γA(c) = minimize
v∈RK ,λ,d∈R
1
2
λ2 + c · 1Tv + d
subject to ATv ≥ (1− λ)p− d1 ,
v ≥ 0.
(37)
Our approach will be to construct a feasible solution to Eq. (37) to demonstrate that γA(c) < c
for all c >
√
2− 1 + 5
√
ℓ
K
.
First note that for c > 1
2
there is a trivial solution where λ = 1, d = 0 and v is the all-zero
vector which shows that γ(c) < c. We now focus on the case c ≤ 1
2
. Let
√
2− 1 ≤ c ≤ 1
2
. We will
develop a lower bound on c which implies γA(c) < c.
Let S be the smallest index i such that pi ≥ c. Note that as A is an ℓ-dense quantum race we
have pS ≤ c+ ℓK . We let
d = (1− λ)
(
1 + pK − pK
pS
)
and
v(i) =


0 if 1 ≤ i < S
(1− λ− d)pS
p¯S
1
pi
(
1
pi
− 1
pi+1
)
if S ≤ i < K
(1− λ− d) pS
p2
K
p¯S
− (1−λ)
pK
if i = K .
The choice of v comes from solving the system of linear equations (AT0 v)i = (1 − λ)pi − d for
S ≤ i ≤ K. The parameter λ will be chosen later.
Let us see that v satisfies the constraints of Eq. (37). Note that
1− λ− d = (1− λ)pK p¯S
pS
thus v(K) = 0 and v ≥ 0 so long as λ ≤ 1.
As mentioned, by construction v satisfies (AT0 v)i = (1 − λ)pi − d for S ≤ i ≤ K. Thus as
A = A0 +
1
2
diag(p)2 and v ≥ 0 we also have (ATv)i ≥ (1− λ)pi − d for S ≤ i ≤ K.
For i < S we have that
(ATv)i ≥ (AT0 v)i
= p¯ip
Tv
≥ p¯SpTv
= (1− λ)pS − d
≥ (1− λ)pi − d .
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Thus the constraint AT0 v ≥ (1− λ)p− d1 is satisfied.
We have shown that v is a feasible solution for any choice of λ ≤ 1. We now choose λ to
minimize the objective value.
Substituting our choices of v, d into the objective value we have
γA(c) ≤ 1
2
λ2 + (1− λ)
(
1 + pK − pK
pS
)
+ c(1− λ)pK
K−1∑
i=S
1
pi
(
1
pi
− 1
pi+1
)
=
1
2
λ2 + (1− λ)
(
1 + pK
(
− p¯S
pS
+ c ·
K−1∑
i=S
1
pi
(
1
pi
− 1
pi+1
)))
Define
β(c) = 1 + pK
(
− p¯S
pS
+ c ·
K−1∑
i=S
1
pi
(
1
pi
− 1
pi+1
))
.
The objective value 1
2
λ2 + (1 − λ)β(c) is minimized over λ by taking λ = β(c). This makes the
objective value β(c)− β(c)2/2.
We have now reduced the problem to showing
β(c)− β(c)2/2− c < 0
The roots of the corresponding quadratic equation are 1 ± √1− 2c. Note that c ≤ 1/2, thus the
square root term will be real. Thus we will simultaneously have β(c) ≤ 1 and β(c)− β(c)2/2 < c
when β(c) < 1 − √1− 2c. In Lemma 35, we show that β(c) < 1 − √1− 2c∗ when √2 − 1 +
5
√
ℓ
K
≤ c ≤ 1
2
. This will conclude the proof.
Lemma 35. β(c) < 1−√1− 2c for any√2− 1 + 5
√
ℓ
K
≤ c ≤ 1
2
.
Proof. The claim is equivalent to showing
K−1∑
i=S
1
pi
(
1
pi
− 1
pi+1
)
<
1
c
(
p¯S
pS
−
√
1− 2c
pK
)
, (38)
for all
√
2− 1 + 5
√
ℓ
K
< c ≤ 1
2
.
We proceed by a series of claims to simplify both the left hand side and the right hand side of
Eq. (38) until we can work the inequality into something easier to prove.
We begin by simplifying the left hand side, for which we use the following claim.
Claim 36. Let p1, . . . , pK be an ℓ-dense sequence. If K ≥ 6ℓ then
K−1∑
i=T ∗
1
pi
(
1
pi
− 1
pi+1
)
≤
√
2 + 1 + 267
ℓ
K
.
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Proof.
K−1∑
i=T ∗
1
pi
(
1
pi
− 1
pi+1
)
=
K−1∑
i=T ∗
1
pi+1
(
1
pi
− 1
pi+1
)
+
K−1∑
i=T ∗
(
1
pi
− 1
pi+1
)2
≤ zT ∗ + σ(T ∗)
≤
√
2 + 1 + (50
√
2 + 196)
ℓ
K
,
by Theorem 27 and Corollary 28.
We now use Claim 36 to upper bound the left hand side of Eq. (38).
Claim 37. Let
√
2− 1 ≤ c ≤ pS ≤ c+ ℓK . Then
K−1∑
i=S
1
pi
(
1
pi
− 1
pi+1
)
≤ 1
c
(
1
c
− (1− c)(
√
2 + 1)
)
+ 287
ℓ
K
.
Proof.
K−1∑
i=S
1
pi
(
1
pi
− 1
pi+1
)
=
K−1∑
i=T ∗
1
pi
(
1
pi
− 1
pi+1
)
−
S−1∑
i=T ∗
1
pi
(
1
pi
− 1
pi+1
)
≤
√
2 + 1 +
267ℓ
K
− 1
pS
S−1∑
i=T ∗
(
1
pi
− 1
pi+1
)
=
√
2 + 1 +
267ℓ
K
− 1
pS
(
1
pT ∗
− 1
pS
)
≤
√
2 + 1 +
267ℓ
K
+
1
p2S
−
√
2 + 1
pS
+
ℓ(
√
2 + 1)2
pSK
≤ 1
pS
(
1
pS
− p¯S(
√
2 + 1)
)
+
ℓ
K
(
267 +
(
√
2 + 1)2
pS
)
≤ 1
c
(
1
c
− (1− c)(
√
2 + 1)
)
+
ℓ
K
(
267 + (
√
2 + 1)2 +
(
√
2 + 1)2
c
)
.
For the fourth line we used Corollary 25 that pT ∗−1 ≤
√
2 − 1, together with ℓ-density to get
pT ∗ ≤
√
2− 1 + ℓ
K
. This then implies 1
pT∗
≥ √2 + 1− ℓ(
√
2+1)2
K
by Eq. (3).
Now that we have obtained an upper bound on the left hand side of Eq. (38), we proceed to
lower bound the right hand side. We use the following claim to do this.
Claim 38. Let
√
2− 1 ≤ c ≤ 1
2
and c ≤ pS ≤ c+ ℓK . Then
1
c
(
p¯S
pS
−
√
1− 2c
pK
)
≥ 1
c
(
1− c
c
−
√
1− 2c
pK
)
− ℓ
c3K
(
1− ℓ
K
)
.
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Proof. As c ≤ pS ≤ c+ ℓK we have
p¯S
pS
≥ 1− c−
ℓ
K
c+ ℓ
K
.
Applying Eq. (3) to 1
c+ℓ/K
gives
p¯S
pS
≥
(
1− c− ℓ
K
)(
1
c
− ℓ
Kc2
)
=
1− c
c
− (1− c)ℓ
Kc2
− ℓ
Kc
+
ℓ2
K2c2
=
1− c
c
− ℓ
Kc2
+
ℓ2
K2c2
.
Putting Claim 37 and Claim 38 together and simplifying, it now suffices to show
0 <
√
2− c(
√
2 + 1)−
√
1− 2c
pK
− ℓτ
K
, (39)
for any
√
2− 1 + 5
√
ℓ
K
< c ≤ 1
2
, where τ = 150.
We find a lower bound on the value of c for which this inequality holds with the next claim.
Claim 39. For any
√
2− 1 +
√
2ℓ(
√
2−1)3
(
τ+ 6(
√
2−1)
5
)
K
< c ≤ 1/2
0 <
√
2− (
√
2 + 1)c−
√
1− 2c
pK
− ℓτ
K
. (40)
Proof. We will use Eq. (5) to bound
√
a− c, specifically in our context the inequality√
3− 2
√
2− 2δ ≤
√
2− 1− (
√
2 + 1)δ − 1
2
(
√
2 + 1)3δ2 . (41)
Consider some δ ≥ 0. By substituting c = √2 − 1 + δ into the left hand side of Eq. (40) and
applying Eq. (41) we obtain
√
2− (
√
2 + 1)c−
√
1− 2c
pK
− ℓτ
K
=
√
2− 1− (
√
2 + 1)δ −
√
3− 2√2− 2δ
pK
− ℓτ
K
≥ (
√
2− 1− (
√
2 + 1)δ)
(
1− 1
pK
)
+
δ2(
√
2 + 1)3
2pK
− ℓτ
K
≥ −
(√
2− 1− (
√
2 + 1)δ
) 6ℓ
5K
+
δ2(
√
2 + 1)3
2
− ℓτ
K
≥ −6(
√
2− 1)ℓ
5K
+
δ2(
√
2 + 1)3
2
− ℓτ
K
.
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For the second to last inequality, we use the observation that 1
pK
≤ 1+ 6ℓ
5K
, which follows from the
conditionK ≥ 6ℓ. The last expression will be positive for
δ >
√√√√2ℓ(√2− 1)3 (τ + 6(√2−1)5 )
K
,
giving the claim.
Applying Claim 39 with the value τ = 150, we see that Eq. (39) will hold for any
√
2− 1 + 5
√
ℓ
K
< c ≤ 1
2
.
This finishes the proof of Lemma 35.
Let us summarize the results of this section. Let (A0, A
T
0 ) be a ℓ-dense symmetric stingy
quantum race and let (A,AT ) be the corresponding quantum race, and suppose that ℓ
K
≤ 1
6
.
Theorem 34 shows that the payoff of any symmetric strategy (y, y) in the game (A,AT ) is at
most
√
2− 1 + 5√ℓ/K. On the other hand, letting (x, x) be the unique coinciding equilibrium in
the game (A0, A0), this strategy achieves payoff at least
√
2−1−O(ℓ/K) in the game (A,AT ) by
Corollary 28. Thus (x, x) is an approximate Nash equilibrium for the game (A,AT ) and moreover
is nearly optimal in terms of payoff (within O(
√
ℓ/K) amongst all symmetric strategies.
5 Multiplayer quantum races
5.1 Basic properties
For an integer n ≥ 2, an n-player game is specified by a set of pure strategies Si, and payoff
functions ui : S → R, for each player i ∈ [n], where by definition S = S1 × · · · × Sn is the
set of pure strategy profiles. For s ∈ S, the value ui(s) is the payoff of player i for pure strategy
profile s. Let S−i = S1 × · · · × Si−1 × Si+1 × · · · × Sn be the set of all pure strategy profiles of
players other than i. For s ∈ S and i ∈ [n], we set the partial pure strategy profile s−i ∈ S−i to
be (s1, . . . si−1, si+1, . . . , sn). For s′ in S−i, and si ∈ Si, we denote by (s′, si) the combined pure
strategy profile (s′1, . . . , s
′
i−1, si, s
′
i+1, . . . , s
′
n) ∈ S. We will suppose that each player has m pure
strategies and that Si = {e1, . . . , em}, the canonical basis of the vector space Rm, for all i ∈ [n],
and therefore S = {e1, . . . , em}n. For simplicity, instead of ej we often say strategy j.
A mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution over Si that we identify with a vector
xi = (x
1
i , . . . x
m
i ) such that x
j
i ≥ 0, for all j ∈ [m], and
∑
j∈[m] x
j
i = 1. We denote by∆i the set of
mixed strategies for i, and we call∆ = ∆1×· · ·×∆r the set ofmixed strategy profiles. For a mixed
strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) and pure strategy profile s ∈ S, the product xs = xs11 xs22 · · ·xsnn
is the probability of s in x. We will consider the multilinear extension of the payoff functions from
S to ∆ defined by ui(x) =
∑
s∈S x
sui(s). The set ∆−i, the partial mixed strategy profile x−i, for
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x ∈ ∆ and i ∈ [n], and the combined mixed strategy profile (x′, xi) for x′ ∈ ∆−i and xi ∈ ∆i are
defined analogously to the pure case.
The pure strategy si is a best response for player i against the partial mixed strategy profile
x′ ∈ ∆−i if it maximizes ui(x′, ·). For x ∈ ∆ and i ∈ [n], we will denote by br(x−i) the set of best
responses of player i against x−i. A Nash equilibrium is a mixed strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xn)
such that sup(xi) ⊆ br(x−i), for all i ∈ [n].
Definition 40 (n-party stingy quantum race). Let n ≥ 2 be a positive integer. An n-party stingy
quantum race is defined by a sequence of increasing probabilities 0 < P1 < P2 < . . . < PK ≤ 1,
for some positive integerK. The set of pure strategies of all players is [K]. For every i, the utility
function of the ith player is defined as
ui(s1, . . . , sn) = Psi
∏
k 6=i,sk≤si
P¯sk .
Consider an n-party stingy quantum race given by the probabilities 0 < P1 < . . . < PK ≤ 1,
and let x−i ∈ ∆−i for some i ∈ [n]. If player i plays the pure strategy s against x−i, her payoff is
ui(x−i, s) = Ps
∏
k 6=i

 ∑
sk∈sup≤s(xk)
xskk P¯sk +
∑
sk∈sup>s(xk)
xskk

 . (42)
The following is the multiparty analog of Claim 14.
Claim 41. Let x = (x1, . . . xn) be a Nash equilibrium of an n-party stingy quantum race defined
by probabilities P1 < . . . < PK . If s1 ∈ sup(xi), for some i ∈ [n], then for all s2 > s1 there exists
k 6= i such that sup≤s1(xk) 6= sup≤s2(xk).
Proof. If sup≤s1(xk) = sup≤s2(xk), for all k 6= i then
ui(x−i, s2) =
Ps2
Ps1
ui(x−i, s1).
As ps1 < ps2 , the payoff for playing s2 is strictly larger than that for playing s1. Therefore s1 is not
a best response for x−i, in contradiction with the definition of a Nash equilibrium.
This claim implies the following properties for the supports of Nash equilibria in a multiplayer
stingy quantum race.
Corollary 42. Let x be a Nash equilibrium of an n-party stingy quantum race defined by proba-
bilities 0 < P1 < P2 < . . . < PK ≤ 1. Then we have:
• ⋃ni=1 sup(xi) is an interval containingK,
• for every i ∈ [n], for every s1, s2 ∈ sup(xi) there exists s ∈
⋃
k 6=i sup(xk) with s1 < s ≤ s2.
Let x be a Nash equilibrium of an n-party stingy quantum race. We say that x is coinciding
if sup(xi) = sup(xk), for all i, k ∈ [n]. We call this common support in a coinciding Nash equi-
librium the support of the equilibrium. In the multiparty case we will only study coinciding Nash
equilibria.
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5.2 Coinciding Nash equilibria of stingy multiplayer races
By Corollary 42 we know that in a coinciding Nash equilibrium of an n-party stingy quantum race
the support of the equilibrium is of the form {T, T + 1, . . . , K}, for some 1 ≤ T ≤ K. We would
like to characterize these coinciding equilibria.
Lemma 43. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn), where xi is a K-dimensional real vector for every i ∈ [n], and
let 1 ≤ T ≤ K. Then x is a Nash equilibrium of support {T, T + 1, . . . , K} in an n-party stingy
quantum race defined by 0 < P1 < . . . < PK ≤ 1 if and only x satisfies the following system, for
all i ∈ [n]:
ui(x−i, t) = ui(x−i, T ) for T < t ≤ K , (43)
ui(x−i, T − 1) ≤ ui(x−i, T ) , (44)
xti = 0 for 0 < t < T , (45)
xti > 0 for T ≤ t ≤ K , (46)
K∑
t=T
xti = 1 . (47)
Proof. For every i ∈ [n], Eq. (45)–(47) express that xi is a probability distribution of support
{T, T + 1, . . . , K}. For T ≥ 2, when playing a strategy t < T against the partial mixed strategy
profile x−i, the ith player’s payoff is maximized if she plays T − 1. Therefore Eq. (43) and (44)
express that the strategies in her support are all best responses against x−i.
Definition 44. For an n-party stingy quantum race defined by 0 < P1 < . . . < PK ≤ 1 we define
its reduced game as the 2-party stingy quantum race defined by the two sequences of probabilities
p1 < . . . < pK , and P1 < . . . < PK where pj = P
1/(n−1)
j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ K.
We denote by A the payoff matrix of the first player in the reduced game
Lemma 45. Let an n-party stingy quantum race be defined by 0 < P1 < . . . < PK ≤ 1, let
x = (x1, . . . , xn), where xi is a K-dimensional vector, and let 1 ≤ T ≤ K. Then Eq. (43)–(47)
are satisfied by x, for every i ∈ [n] if and only if Eq. (6)–(10) for the reduced game are satisfied by
xi, for every i ∈ [n].
Proof. First we do the “if” direction. By Lemma 19, there is a unique solution to Eq. (6), (8)
and (10), thus if these are satisfied by each xi then we must have x1 = · · · = xn. Let y be this
common vector. Then for every t ∈ [T − 1, K],
ui(x−i, t) = Pt
∏
k 6=i

 ∑
sk∈sup≤t(xk)
xskk P¯sk +
∑
sk∈sup>t(xk)
xskk


= Pt
(
eTt Ay
pt
)n−1
=
(
eTt Ay
)n−1
.
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We now prove the “only if” direction. Let us suppose that x satisfies Eq. (43)–(47). Eq. (8)–
(10) are respectively identical to Eq. (45)–(47), and therefore are satisfied. Let us consider Eq. (6).
We fix some T < t ≤ K. From Eq. (42) we have, for every i ∈ [n],
ui(x−i, t) = Pt
∏
k 6=i
(∑
j≤t
xjkP¯j +
∑
j>t
xjk
)
, (48)
and
ui(x−i, T ) = PT
∏
k 6=i
(
xTk P¯T +
∑
j>T
xjk
)
. (49)
Therefore
(
eTt Axi
)n−1
= pn−1t
(∑
j≤t
xji P¯j +
∑
j>t
xji
)n−1
=
pn−1t P
n−1
t
P nt
1
ui(x−i, t)n−1
n∏
ℓ=1
uℓ(x−ℓ, t)
=
1
ui(x−i, t)n−1
n∏
ℓ=1
uℓ(x−ℓ, t)
=
1
ui(x−i, T )n−1
n∏
ℓ=1
uℓ(x−ℓ, T )
=
(
eTTAxi
)n−1
.
The second equality follows from the fact that
n∏
ℓ=1
uℓ(x−ℓ, t) = P nt
n∏
k=1
(∑
j≤t
xjkP¯j +
∑
j>t
xjk
)n−1
,
for the third equality we used pn−1t−1 = Pt−1, and for the fourth equality we used Eq. (43). As
eTt Axi, e
T
TAxi are real and nonnegative, it follows that e
T
t Axi = e
T
TAxi for all T < t ≤ K,
establishing that Eq. (6) holds.
Now we turn to Eq. (7). Since for every i ∈ [n], Eq. (6), (8) and (10) are satisfied by xi, from
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Lemma 19 we know that x1 = · · · = xn. Thus for every i ∈ [n], we have
(
eTT−1Axi
)n−1
= pn−1T−1
∏
k 6=i
(
K∑
j=T
xjk
)
= ui(x−i, T − 1)
≤ ui(x−i, T )
= PT
∏
k 6=i
(
xTk P¯T +
∑
j>T
xjk
)
=
(
eTTAxi
)n−1
,
where for the first equality we used x1 = · · · = xn, for the second equality we used pn−1t−1 = PT−1,
and for the inequality we used Eq. (44). The statement of the Lemma therefore follows.
Theorem 46. An n-party stingy quantum race always has a unique coinciding Nash equilibrium
x = (x1, . . . , xn), where x1 = · · · = xn. If the game is defined by the probabilities 0 < P1 < P2 <
· · · < PK then the coinciding equilibrium has support {T ∗, T ∗+1, . . . , K}, where T ∗ = T ∗B of the
reduced game, and for all i ∈ [n], the distribution xi is defined on its support as
xti =
{
rBT ∗/z
B
T ∗ if t = T
∗,
qBt /z
B
T ∗ if T
∗ < t ≤ K.
Proof. Combining Lemma 43 and Lemma 45, we get that x is a coinciding Nash equilibrium of
support {T, T + 1, . . . , K} if and only if xi satisfies Eq. (6)–(10) for the reduced game, for all
i ∈ [n]. By Lemma 21 this happens if and only if T = T ∗B of the reduced game, and the unique
solution for xi, for i ∈ [n], is the one stated by the Theorem.
5.3 Collision probability of the stingy coinciding equilibrium
Our main objective in this section is to upper bound the collision probability—the probability that
two or more players succeed at the same time—in the coinciding equilibrium found in the last
section for an ℓ-dense stingy n-player quantum race. To help with this, we make the following
definition.
Definition 47. For a joint probability distribution y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ ∆, let cpmi (y) denote the
probability that player i succeeds first and that exactlym players (including i) succeed at the same
time under the joint strategy y. Let cpi(y) =
∑n
m=2 cp
m
i (y) denote the probability that player i
succeeds first and at least one other player succeeds at the same time.
Let us also set up notation to describe the coinciding equilibrium in a stingy multiplayer race.
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Define
qi =
1
Pi
(
1
P
1/(n−1)
i−1
− 1
P
1/(n−1)
i
)
rT =
1
P¯T
(
1
P
1/(n−1)
K
−
K∑
i=T+1
P¯iqi
)
zT = rT +
K∑
i=T+1
qi .
Let T ∗ be the starting point of the support of the coinciding equilibrium. Then by Theorem 46, the
strategy of player i in the coinciding equilibrium is given by
xti =


rT ∗/zT ∗ if t = T
∗,
qt/zT ∗ if T
∗ < t ≤ K,
0 if t < T ∗ .
(50)
To obtain concrete bounds on the collision probability, we will need bounds on zT ∗ and PT ∗−1.
Lemma 48. In any stingy multiplayer quantum race with n players (1/zT ∗)
n−1 < 1/n.
Proof. The probability that any given player wins the race is (1/z∗T )
n−1. As in a stingy race no
two players can win at the same time, the probability that the race has a winner is exactly n/zn−1T ∗ .
The probability that no one wins the race, which occurs if two or more players succeed at the same
time, or if no one succeeds, is positive, thus (1/zT ∗)
n−1 < 1/n.
Theorem 49. Let P1, . . . , PK define a stingy n-player quantum race with n ≥ 2. Then PT ∗−1 < 1n .
If in addition P1, ...., PK form an ℓ-dense sequence and 4eℓn ≤ K then PT ∗−1 ≥ 12en , where e is
Euler’s number.
Proof. As T ∗ − 1 is not in the support of the coinciding Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that
PT ∗−1 ≤
(
1
zT∗
)n−1
< 1
n
, by Lemma 48.
Now we turn to the lower bound. If PT ∗+1 >
1
n
then as P1, . . . , PK is ℓ-dense we must have
PT ∗−1 ≥ 1n − 2ℓK ≥ 12en and the proof is done. Otherwise, define S = maxi>T ∗{i : Pi ≤ 1n}. Note
that by definition and ℓ-density we have 1
n
≥ pS ≥ 1n − ℓK . Now we know from the positivity
condition of rT∗ that
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1 >
K∑
T ∗+1
P¯iqi
≥
S∑
T ∗+1
1− Pi
Pi
(
P
− 1
n−1
i−1 − P
− 1
n−1
i
)
≥ 1− PS
PS
(
P
− 1
n−1
T ∗ − P
− 1
n−1
S
)
≥ (n− 1)
(
P
− 1
n−1
T ∗ −
(
Kn
K − ℓn
) 1
n−1
)
≥ (n− 1)
(
P
− 1
n−1
T ∗ −
(
4en
4e− 1
) 1
n−1
)
.
For the last inequality we have used that ℓn ≤ K
4e
. Rearranging the last inequality we have
PT∗ ≥

 n− 1
1 + (n− 1) (1 + 4en
4e−1
) 1
n−1


n−1
.
This means
ln(P ∗T ) ≥ (n− 1)
(
ln(n− 1)− ln
(
1 + (n− 1)
(
4en
4e− 1
)1/(n−1)))
= − ln
(
4en
4e− 1
)
− (n− 1) ln
(
1 + (n− 1)−1
(
4en
4e− 1
)−1/(n−1))
.
It now remains to upper bound
(n− 1) ln
(
1 + (n− 1)−1
(
4en
4e− 1
)−1/(n−1))
≤
(
4en
4e− 1
)−1/(n−1)
≤ 1 ,
for n ≥ 2, where we have used ln(1 + x) ≤ x to obtain the first inequality. Putting it together we
have ln(PT ∗) ≥ − ln( 4en4e−1)− 1, which implies PT ∗−1 ≥ PT ∗ − ℓK ≥ 12en .
The next lemma bounds the collision probability for player i when all players but player i play
according to the coinciding equilibrium, and player i plays an arbitrary strategy v. We will use
this lemma to bound the total collision probability and also in Section 5.4 to show that the stingy
coinciding equilibrium is an approximate equilibrium in a multiparty race.
Lemma 50. Let P1, ...., PK define an ℓ-dense stingy n-player quantum race, n ≥ 2, with 4enℓ ≤
K, and let x be the unique coinciding equilibrium given by Eq. (50). Then cpi(x−i, v) ≤ 8eℓK for
any i ∈ [n] and v ∈ ∆i.
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Proof. We use the notation from the definition of the coinciding equilibrium in Eq. (50). Note that
since pT ∗ ≥ 12en by Lemma 50, and we assume that ℓK ≤ 14en , it must be the case that T ∗ ≥ 2, and
therefore it makes sense to talk about T ∗ − 1. Further, note that zT ∗ ≥ 1 by Lemma 48.
We upper bound cpi(x−i, v) by multiplying the probability that player i and player j succeed
at the same time (not necessarily first) by n− 1.
cpi(x−i, v) ≤
n− 1
z∗T
(
P 2T ∗vT ∗rT ∗ +
K∑
t=T ∗+1
P 2t vtqt
)
≤ n− 1
z∗T
K∑
t=T ∗
P 2t vtqt
=
n− 1
z∗T
K∑
t=T ∗
Ptvt

 1
P
1
n−1
t−1
− 1
P
1
n−1
t


=
n− 1
z∗T
K∑
t=T ∗
Ptvt
P
1
n−1
t − P
1
n−1
t−1
(Pt−1Pt)
1
n−1
For notational convenience, let f(x) = x
1
n−1 . By the concavity of f on [0,∞) we can upper bound
f(Pt)− f(Pt−1) by
f(Pi)− f(Pi−1) ≤ (Pi − Pi−1)f ′(Pi−1) ≤
ℓP
2−n
n−1
i−1
K(n− 1) . (51)
Using this upper bound, we can continue:
cpi(x−i, v) ≤
ℓ
KzT ∗
K∑
t=T ∗
Ptvt
P
2−n
n−1
t−1
(Pt−1Pt)
1
n−1
=
ℓ
KzT ∗
K∑
t=T ∗
vt
1
P
1
n−1
t−1
(
Pt
Pt−1
)n−2
n−1
≤ 4eℓ
KzT ∗
K∑
t=T ∗
vt
(
Pt
Pt−1
)n−2
n−1
,
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as (2en)1/(n−1) ≤ 4e for all n ≥ 2. Continuing, we have
cpi(x−i, v) ≤
4eℓ
KzT ∗
K∑
t=T ∗
vt
(
1 +
ℓ
KPt−1
)n−2
n−1
≤ 4eℓ
KzT ∗
(
1 +
2enℓ
K
)n−2
n−1
≤ 8eℓ
K
.
Theorem 8. Let P1, ...., PK define an ℓ-dense stingy n-player quantum race such that 4enℓ ≤ K.
When the players play the coinciding equilibrium of the stingy race, the probability that two or
more players succeed at the same time is at most 8enℓ
K
.
Proof. The probability that two or more players succeed at the same time is at most
n∑
i=1
cpi(x) ≤
8enℓ
K
,
by Lemma 50.
5.4 Multiplayer quantum races
In this section we use our results about the stingy multiplayer quantum race to analyse the mul-
tiplayer quantum race. Namely, we show that the coinciding equilibrium in a stingy multiplayer
quantum race is an approximate equilibrium in a multiplayer race. The difference between a stingy
multiplayer race and a multiplayer race is that in a multiplayer race, the payoff is equally divided
amongst all players who succeed first at the same time.
Definition 51 (Multiplayer quantum race). Let ui be the payoff function for player i ∈ [n] in the
n-player stingy race defined by P1 < · · · < Pk, as given by Eq. (42). The payoff function u′i in the
n-player quantum race defined by P1, . . . , Pk is
u′i(x) = ui(x) +
n∑
m=2
cpmi (x)
m
.
While the tie-splitting payoff in Definition 51 is quite natural, one could imagine other defini-
tions in-between stingy multiplayer races and the definition of multiplayer races we have given.
Our results in this section depend very weakly on the exact definition of how ties are split in a
multiplayer race. In fact, the only property we use is
u′i(x) ≤ ui(x) + cpi(x) . (52)
This property holds under any reasonable definition of tie-splitting.
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Now we show Theorem 9 from the introduction that the coinciding Nash equilibrium in a
multiplayer stingy quantum race is an approximate Nash equilibrium in a multiplayer quantum
race.
Theorem 9. Let P1, ...., PK define an ℓ-dense stingy n-player quantum race, n ≥ 2, with 4enℓ ≤
K. If x = (x1, ..., xn) is the coinciding Nash equilibrium for this stingy race, then x is an
8eℓ
K
-
approximate Nash equilibrium of the corresponding quantum race.
Proof. Since x is a Nash equilibrium in the stingy race, for any i ∈ [n] and probability vector
v ∈ ∆i we have
ui(x) ≥ ui(x−i, v) . (53)
By Definition 51 and Eq. (52) we have
u′i(x) ≥ ui(x) ≥ u′i(x−i, v)− cpi(x−i, v)
≥ u′i(x−i, v)−
8eℓ
K
,
by Lemma 50.
6 Conclusion
We conclude with some open problems.
• Can we characterize all Nash equilibria in the multiparty stingy quantum race? We have
given a coinciding Nash equilibrium and shown that it is unique, however, it would be inter-
esting to classify the Nash equilibria where players play strategies with different supports.
• Can we show that the approximate Nash equilibriumwe have given for a multiparty quantum
race is nearly optimal in terms of payoff among all symmetric Nash equilibria? We were able
to do this in the two-party case, however, this proof used tools like quadratic programming
that are not available in the multiparty case.
• Our model of quantum races assumes that if a player measures and is unsuccessful then
she simply stops playing. A more realistic scenario is that, if a player measures and fails,
she immediately restarts and tries again. Do the Nash equilibria in this version of the game
change substantially? The large number of available strategies in this version of the game
make it much more difficult to analyze.
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A Symmetric 2-player stingy quantum races
In this appendix we finish the characterization of all Nash equilibria in a symmetric 2-player stingy
quantum race. We have seen in Corollary 16 that a Nash equilibrium in a symmetric stingy quan-
tum race is either coinciding, alternating, or alternating-coinciding, and in Theorem 22 we have
given the unique coinciding equilibrium. In this section, we characterize when alternating and
alternating-coinciding equilibria exist. We begin by looking at alternating equilibria.
For the rest of this section, fix a stingy symmetric quantum race defined by probabilities 0 <
p1 < p2 < . . . < pK ≤ 1, for some integerK > 0.
A.1 Alternating equilibrium
A.1.1 At most one equilibrium
We first consider the case of when an alternating equilibrium can exist. To do this, it will be handy
to introduce some notation. For natural numbers T < K, we let [T,K] = {T, T +1, T +2, . . .K},
and further let D(T,K) = {T, T + 2, T + 4, . . . , K} in the case T,K have the same parity and
D(T,K) = {T, T + 2, T + 4, . . . , K − 1} in case T,K have opposite parity. We may assume, up
to renaming of the players, that Alice plays at the smallest time. Thus by Corollary 16 we know
that in an alternating equilibrium Alice’s support isD(T,K) = {T, T +2, T + 4, . . . , K − 1} and
38
that Bob’s support isD(T + 1, K) = {T + 1, T + 3, . . . , K}, for some number 1 ≤ T ≤ K, such
thatK − T is odd.
We define the values q˜T , for T = 2, . . . , K − 1, and the values r˜T , R˜T , z˜T and Z˜T , such that
1 ≤ T < K andK − T is odd, as follows:
q˜T =
1
pT
·
(
1
pT−1
− 1
pT+1
)
,
r˜T =
1
p¯T
·

 1
pK
−
∑
i∈D(T+2,K)
p¯iq˜i

 ,
R˜T =
1
pK−1
−
∑
i∈D(T+1,K−2)
p¯iq˜i,
z˜T = r˜T +
∑
i∈D(T+2,K)
q˜i,
Z˜T = R˜T +
∑
j∈D(T+1,K−2)
q˜j .
Definition 52. Define T˜ ∗ as the smallest integer 1 ≤ T < K such that r˜T > 0 andK − T is odd.
This is a valid definition since r˜K−1 = 1/(p¯K−1pK) > 0. The following theorem states that
there is at most one alternating Nash equilibrium in a symmetric stingy quantum race.
Theorem 53. Every 2-party symmetric stingy quantum race has exactly one alternating Nash
equilibrium if R˜T˜ ∗ > 0 and pK
(
1
pK−1
− pKRT˜ ∗
)
≤ 1, and no alternating Nash equilibrium
otherwise. The supports of the equilibrium (x, y) are sup(x) = D(T˜ ∗, K) and sup(y) = D(T˜ ∗ +
1, K), and the distributions are defined as:
xi =
{
r˜T˜ ∗/z˜T˜ ∗ if i = T˜
∗,
q˜i/z˜T˜ ∗ if i ∈ D(T + 2, K),
yj =
{
R˜T˜ ∗/Z˜T˜ ∗ if j = K,
q˜j/Z˜T˜ ∗ if j ∈ D(T + 1, K − 2).
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 19, instead of probability distributions we will normalize the
strategies such that the payoff is 1. We claim that the conditions of Nash equilibrium for such a
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distribution can be expressed by the following system:
eTi Ay = 1 for i ∈ D(T,K) , (54)
eTi Ay ≤ 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ K , (55)
eTj Ax = 1 for j ∈ D(T + 1, K) , (56)
eTj Ax ≤ 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ K , (57)
0 < xi for i ∈ D(T,K) , (58)
0 < yj for j ∈ D(T + 1, K) . (59)
xi = 0 for i ∈ [T − 1] ∪D(T + 1, K) (60)
yj = 0 for j ∈ [T − 1] ∪D(T,K). (61)
In matrix form Eq. (54) can be expressed as:

1 1 1 · · · 1
p¯T+1 1 1 · · · 1
p¯T+1 p¯T+3 1 · · · 1
p¯T+1 p¯T+3 p¯T+5 · · · 1
...
. . .
...
p¯T+1 p¯T+3 p¯T+5 · · · 1




yT+1
yT+3
yT+5
...
yK

 =


1/pT
1/pT+2
1/pT+4
1/pT+6
...
1/pK−1


. (62)
Simplifying the system gives

pT+1 0 0 · · · 0
0 pT+3 0 · · · 0
0 0 pT+5 · · · 0
0 0 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
p¯T+1 p¯T+3 p¯T+5 · · · 1




yT+1
yT+3
yT+5
...
yK

 =


1/pT − 1/pT+2
1/pT+2 − 1/pT+4
1/pT+4 − 1/pT+6
1/pT+6 − 1/pT+8
...
1/pK−1


.
The unique solution is
yj = q˜j , for j ∈ D(T + 1, K − 2),
yK = R˜T .
Eq. (56) in matrix form gives a very similar system:

p¯T 1 1 · · · 1
p¯T p¯T+2 1 · · · 1
p¯T p¯T+2 p¯T+4 · · · 1
...
. . .
...
p¯T p¯T+2 p¯T+4 · · · p¯K−1




xT
xT+2
xT+4
...
xK−1

 =


1/pT+1
1/pT+3
1/pT+5
...
1/pK

 . (63)
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Similarly simplifying this system we have

0 pT+2 0 · · · 0
0 0 pT+4 · · · 0
0 0 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
p¯T p¯T+2 p¯T+4 · · · p¯K−1




xT
xT+2
xT+4
...
xK−1

 =


1/pT+1 − 1/pT+3
1/pT+3 − 1/pT+5
1/pT+5 − 1/pT+7
...
1/pK

 .
The unique solution is
xi = q˜i, for i ∈ D(T + 2, K),
xT = r˜T .
Since q˜t is positive for every 2 ≤ t ≤ K − 1, Eq. (58)–(59) are equivalent to
r˜T > 0, (64)
R˜T > 0. (65)
We now check Eq. (55). As Alice’s payoff for playing a time i < T is maximized when
i = T − 1, we may assume that i ∈ D(T − 1, K). Consider first the case where Alice plays
in D(T − 1, K − 2); we will treat the case Alice plays time K later. When Alice plays i ∈
D(T − 1, K − 2) then i + 1 is in sup(x). Moreover D(T + 1, K)≤i = D(T + 1, K)≤i+1. This
means that the payoff for Alice playing i + 1 ∈ sup(x) is strictly larger than that for playing i,
specifically
eTi Ay =
pi
pi+1
eTi+1Ay < 1. (66)
Thus Alice has no advantage in switching to the strategy i.
We have now reduced Eq. (55) to the condition eTKAy ≤ 1. We cannot use the preceeding
argument to get rid of this condition as K + 1 6∈ sup(x). Let us now simplify this condition.
Substituting in y gives the condition
pK

 ∑
j∈E(T )\{K}
p¯j q˜j + p¯KR˜T

 ≤ 1 . (67)
Now observe that by Eq. (66) with i = K − 2,
pK−2

 ∑
j∈E(T )\{K}
p¯j q˜j + R˜T

 = pK−2
pK−1
.
Using this equality shows that Eq. (67) is equivalent to
pK
(
1
pK−1
− pKRT˜ ∗
)
≤ 1 . (68)
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Now consider Eq. (57). First say Bob plays a time j ∈ D(T,K − 1). In this case j + 1 ∈
D(T +1, K). Similarly to Alice’s case Eq. (66),D(T,K−1)≤j = D(T,K−1)≤j+1 and therefore
eTj Ax =
pj
pj+1
eTj+1Ax < 1. Thus Bob has no advantage in playing time j. Finally, consider the case
where Bob plays a time j < T . In such a case, Bob’s success probability is maximized by playing
time j = T − 1. This gives the condition
eTT−1Ax = pT−1

r˜T + ∑
i∈D(T+2,K)
q˜i

 ≤ 1 . (69)
To summarize the current situation, Eq. (54)–(61) are equivalent to Eq. (64)–(65), (68)–(69).
By the definition of T˜ ∗, Eq. (64) is satisfied if and only if T ≥ T˜ ∗.
We claim now that Eq. (69) is satisfied if and only if T ≤ T˜ ∗. To prove this, first note that
p¯T−2r˜T−2 = p¯T (r˜T − q˜T ) . (70)
Using that, from Eq. (63), applied to the case where the interval begins at T − 2, we derive
pT−1

p¯T r˜T + pT q˜T + ∑
i∈D(T+2,K)
q˜i

 = 1. (71)
Therefore Eq. (69) holds if and only if r˜T ≤ q˜T . From Eq. (70) this is equivalent to r˜T−2 ≤ 0, and
the claim then follows from the definition of T˜ ∗.
To conclude, we have seen that there can not be more than one alternating Nash equilibrium,
and there is one for T = T ∗ if Eq. (65) and (68) are satisfied, which is exactly the statement of the
Theorem.
A.1.2 Starting value
For this subsection we will impose a further natural restriction on the probabilities defining a
quantum race that also holds for the Grover race. We define a convex quantum race.
Definition 54 (Convex race). LetK be a positive integer. We say that the sequence (n1, . . . , nK) ∈
R
K is convex if for all 1 < i < K, we have 2ni ≤ ni−1 + ni+1. A symmetric (stingy) quantum
race specified by the probabilities 0 < p1 < . . . < pK ≤ 1 is called convex if (1/p1, . . . , 1/pK) is
a convex sequence.
If f : [1, K] → R is a convex real function on the interval [1, K], and by definition ni = f(i),
for 1 ≤ i ≤ K, then clearly the sequence (n1, . . . , nK) is convex, which motivates the above
definition. The (stingy) Grover race is convex as csc2(2(t+1/2) arcsin( 1√
N
)) is a convex function.
For 2-player convex symmetric stingy quantum races we can show that the starting point of the
support of the symmetric Nash equilibrium and the starting point of the support of the alternating
Nash equilibrium (if it exists) are the same, modulo a correction in parity.
Theorem 55. Let p1, . . . , pK define a convex a 2-player symmetric stingy quantum race.
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1. If K − T ∗ is odd then T˜ ∗ = T ∗,
2. If K − T ∗ is even then T˜ ∗ ∈ {T ∗ − 1, T ∗ + 1}.
Proof. Lemma 56 below shows that T ∗ ≤ T˜ ∗ + 1. This direction does not make use of the con-
vexity assumption. Lemma 58 below shows T˜ ∗ ≤ T ∗ + 1 and does make use of the convexity
assumption. From these two statements the Theorem follows.
Lemma 56. In every 2-player symmetric stingy quantum race we have T ∗ ≤ T˜ ∗ + 1.
Proof. We first claim that for every odd i such that 3 ≤ i ≤ K − 1, we have
p¯iq˜i > p¯iqi + p¯i+1qi+1 . (72)
For this first note that piq˜i = piqi+pi+1qi+1. Thus the claim is equivalent to showing q˜i > qi+qi+1,
which is is true since q˜i − qi = pi+1pi qi+1 > qi+1.
We now claim that for every T such that 1 ≤ T ≤ K − 1 andK − T is odd, we have
r˜T > 0 =⇒ rT+1 > 0 , (73)
from which the statement of the Lemma clearly follows. This claim is clearly true for T = K − 1,
therefore we suppose that T ≤ K − 3 andK − T is odd. Summing up Eq. (72) overD(T + 2, K)
we get ∑
i∈D(T+2,K)
p¯iq˜i >
K∑
i=T+2
p¯iqi ,
from which Eq. (73) immediately follows.
Claim 57. In a 2-player convex symmetric stingy quantum race, for every 4 ≤ i ≤ K−2, we have
p¯iqi + p¯i+1qi+1 > p¯i+1q˜i+1 . (74)
Proof. Recall that qi+1 − q˜i+1 = −pi+2pi+1qi+2. Thus
p¯iqi + p¯i+1qi+1 − p¯i+1q˜i+1 = p¯i
pi
piqi − p¯i+1
pi+1
pi+2qi+2
=
(
1
pi
− 1
)(
1
pi−1
− 1
pi
)
−
(
1
pi+1
− 1
)(
1
pi+1
− 1
pi+2
)
>
(
1
pi+1
− 1
)(
1
pi−1
− 1
pi
− 1
pi+1
+
1
pi+2
)
>
1
pi−1
− 1
pi
− 1
pi+1
+
1
pi+2
=
(
1
pi−1
− 2
pi
+
1
pi+1
)
+
(
1
pi
− 2
pi+1
+
1
pi+2
)
≥ 0 ,
where the last inequality holds by convexity of (1/p1, . . . , 1/pK).
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Lemma 58. In a 2-player convex symmetric stingy quantum race we have T˜ ∗ ≤ T ∗ + 1.
Proof. The proof of the Lemma will follow from the following statement. For every 1 ≤ T ≤
K − 1, we have:
K − T is odd and rT > 0 =⇒ r˜T > 0, (75)
K − T is even and rT > 0 =⇒ r˜T+1 > 0. (76)
Eq. (75) follows since r˜T > rT by summing over Eq. (74). Similarly, we can see that r˜T+1 > rT
by summing over Eq. (74) from T + 2 untilK − 1:
∑
i∈D(T+3,K)
p¯iq˜i <
K−1∑
i=T+2
p¯iqi,
from which Eq. (76) follows.
A.2 Alternating-coinciding Nash equilibria
In this section, we turn to the third possible strategy structure for a Nash equilibrium, alternating-
coinciding. In this case, Alice and Bob play at alternating times from time T until time c − 1,
at which point they play the same times in the interval [c,K]. In other words, Alice’s strategy is
supported on a set A = {T, T + 2, . . . , c− 2, c, c+ 1, . . . , K} and Bob’s strategy is supported on
B = {T + 1, T + 3, . . . , c − 1, c, c + 1, . . . , K}. We call this a (T, c,K)-alternating-coinciding
strategy, and refer to c as the change point. As we have already treated the coinciding and purely
alternating cases, we will assume in this section that T < c ≤ k.
To study alternating-coinciding Nash equilibria, we need to define the following quantities.
qt =
1
pt
(
1
pt−1
− 1
pt
)
, for 1 < t ≤ K
q˜t =
1
pt
(
1
pt−1
− 1
pt+1
)
, for 1 < t < K
rt,c =
1
p¯t

 1
pK
−
∑
i∈D(t+2,c−2)
p¯iq˜i −
K∑
i=c
p¯iqi

 , for 1 ≤ t < c ≤ K
Rt,c =
1
pK
−
∑
i∈D(t+1,c−3)
p¯iq˜i −
K∑
i=c+1
p¯iqi, for 1 ≤ t < c ≤ K
wi,t,c = p¯ipc−1q˜c−1 − piRt,c, for 1 ≤ t < i ≤ c ≤ K
zt,c = rt,c +
∑
i∈D(t+2,c−2)
q˜i +
K∑
i=c
qi
Zt,c =
∑
i∈D(t+1,c−3)
q˜i − wc,T,c
pc − pc−1 +
wc−1,T,c
pc − pc−1 +
K∑
i=c
qi
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Theorem 59. Let p1 < p2 < · · · < pK define a symmetric stingy quantum race. Let 1 ≤ T < c ≤
K be such that T, c are odd. There is a (T, c,K)-alternating-coinciding Nash equilibrium (x, y) if
and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
1
pT−1
≥ rt,c +
∑
i∈D(T+2,c−2)
q˜i +
K∑
i=c
qi , (77)
1
pc−1
≥
∑
i∈D(T+1,c−3)
p¯iq˜i − p¯c−1 wc,T,c
pc − pc−1 +
wc−1,T,c
pc − pc−1 +
K∑
i=c+1
qi , (78)
1
pK
>
∑
i∈D(T+2,c−2)
p¯iq˜i +
K∑
i=c
p¯iqi , (79)
p¯c−1q˜c−1 > RT,c . (80)
If these constraints are satisfied then the Nash equilibrium is given by
xi =


rT,c/zT,c if i = T
q˜i/zT,c if i ∈ D(T + 2, c− 2)
qi/zT,c if i ∈ [c,K]
0 otherwise
, yj =


q˜j/ZT,c if j ∈ D(T + 1, c− 3)
− wc,T,c
ZT,c(pc−pc−1) if j = c− 1
wc−1,T,c
ZT,c(pc−pc−1) if j = c
qj/ZT,c if j ∈ [c,K]
0 otherwise.
Proof. LetA = D(T, c− 2)∪{c, c+1, . . . , K} be Alice’s support set and B = D(T +1, c− 1)∪
{c, c + 1, . . . , K} be Bob’s support set. A Nash equilibrium (x, y) with x supported on A and y
supported on B must satisfy the equations
eTi Ay = e
T
j Ay for all i, j ∈ A
eTi Ax = e
T
j Ax for all i, j ∈ B
By multiplying x and y by appropriate constants, we can obtain x′, y′ (now unnormalized) that
satisfy
eTi Ay
′ = 1 for all i ∈ A
eTi Ax
′ = 1 for all i ∈ B
These sytems of linear equations can be solved similarly to the systems in the symmetric and
alternating cases, and always have a unique solution given by
x′i =


rT,c if i = T
q˜i if i ∈ D(T + 2, c− 2)
qi if i ∈ [c,K]
0 otherwise
, y′j =


q˜j if j ∈ D(T + 1, c− 3)
− wc,T,c
pc−pc−1 if j = c− 1
wc−1,T,c
pc−pc−1 if j = c
qj if j ∈ [c,K]
0 otherwise.
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For (the normalized versions of) x′, y′ to actually be a Nash equlibrium, x′, y′ also need to satisfy
the following additional inequalities.
eTj Ax
′ ≤ 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ K , (81)
eTi Ay
′ ≤ 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ K , (82)
0 < x′i for i ∈ A , (83)
0 < y′j for j ∈ B , (84)
We now simplify these conditions given the values of x′, y′, beginning with Eq. (81). With x′
defined as above, eTj Ax
′ = pj/pj+1 for j ≥ T, j 6∈ B. This is always at most one. Thus for
Eq. (81) what remains to be checked is that eTT−1Ax
′ ≤ 1.
Similarly for Eq. (82) with y′ as defined above we see that eTi Ay
′ = pi/pi+1 for T − 1 ≤ i <
c− 1, i 6∈ A. As playing a time i < T − 1 will result in a strictly smaller payoff than playing time
T − 1, the only constraint that is not immediate is eTc−1Ay′ ≤ 1.
Now for the positivity conditions, Eq. (83) and (84). It is clear that q˜i, qi > 0 for T < i ≤ K
as the probabilities pj form an increasing sequence. The remaining positivity conditions that must
be checked are rT,c, wc−1,T,c,−wc,T,c > 0. The condition wc−1,T,c > 0 is equivalent to RT,c <
p¯c−1q˜c−1, and the condition −wc,T,c > 0 is equivalent to
RT,c > p¯cpc−1q˜c−1/pc
= p¯c−1q˜c−1 − pc − pc−1
pc
q˜c−1 .
This gives us the following simplified set of constraints.
eTT−1Ax
′ ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ 1
pT−1
≥ rt,c +
∑
i∈D(T+2,c−2)
q˜i +
K∑
i=c
qi , (85)
eTc−1Ay
′ ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ 1
pc−1
≥
∑
i∈D(T+1,c−3)
p¯iq˜i − p¯c−1 wc,T,c
pc − pc−1 +
wc−1,T,c
pc − pc−1 +
K∑
i=c+1
qi ,
(86)
rT,c > 0 ⇐⇒ 1
pK
>
∑
i∈D(T+2,c−2)
p¯iq˜i +
K∑
i=c
p¯iqi , (87)
wc−1,T,c,−wc,T,c > 0, ⇐⇒ p¯c−1q˜c−1 > RT,c > p¯c−1q˜c−1 − pc − pc−1
pc
q˜c−1 . (88)
We can further simplify the constraint in Eq. (88). As eTc Ay
′ = 1, we have
1
pc
=
∑
i∈E(T+1,c−3)
p¯iq˜i − p¯c−1 wc,T,c
pc − pc−1 + p¯c
wc−1,T,c
pc − pc−1 +
K∑
i=c+1
qi .
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This means that Eq. (86) is equivalent to
1
pc−1
− 1
pc
≥ pc wc−1,T,c
pc − pc−1 ⇐⇒ qc ≥ x
′
c .
Rewriting this inequality in terms of RT,c gives
RT,c ≥ p¯c−1q˜c−1 − qc
(
pc − pc−1
pc−1
)
. (89)
This constraint actually implies the lower bound of Eq. (88). To see this, note that
pc − pc−1
pc−1
qc =
pc − pc−1
pc−1pc
(
1
pc−1
− 1
pc
)
<
pc − pc−1
pc−1pc
(
1
pc−2
− 1
pc
)
=
pc − pc−1
pc
q˜c−1 .
Thus the lower bound in Eq. (88) is a redundant constraint and can be removed. This finishes the
proof of the theorem.
Next we examine which values of T can be the starting point of an alternating-coinciding
equilibrium.
Definition 60. Let T ∗ be as in Definition 20. For c > T ∗ define Tˆ ∗c = min{T : rT,c > 0}.
The condition c > T ∗ is taken so that Tˆ ∗c is always well defined. The next claim shows that the
starting point of an alternating-coinciding equilibrium with change point c must be Tˆ ∗c .
Claim 61. Let p1 < p2 < · · · < pK define a symmetric stingy quantum race. For any 1 < c < K,
the starting support of an alternating-coinciding Nash equilibrium with change point c (if it exists)
must be Tˆ ∗c = min{T : rT,c > 0}.
Proof. Note that rT,c is an increasing function of T . This means that the condition rT,c > 0
(Eq. (79)) will only be satisfied for Tˆ ∗c ≤ T ≤ c.
We now see that to satisfy Eq. (77) we must have T ≤ Tˆ ∗c . From the definition of rt,c we have
p¯t−2
p¯t
rt−2,c = rt,c − q˜t .
As rTˆ ∗c −2,c ≤ 0 and rTˆ ∗c ,c > 0, this means that rTˆ ∗c ,c ≤ q˜Tˆ ∗ and rT,c > q˜T for T > Tˆ ∗c .
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Considering when Bob plays strategy T − 1 when the starting point of the interval is T − 2, we
see that
1
pT−1
= p¯T−2rT−2,c +
∑
i∈D(T,c−2)
q˜i +
K∑
i=c
qi
= p¯T (rT,c − q˜T ) +
∑
i∈D(T,c−2)
q˜i +
K∑
i=c
qi
= p¯trT,c + pT q˜T +
∑
i∈D(T+2,c−2)
q˜i +
K∑
i=c
qi
From this equality we see that if rT,c > q˜T then
1
pT−1
< rT,c +
∑
i∈O(T+2,c)
q˜i +
K∑
i=c
qi
and so will violate Eq. (85). Thus the starting point of a alternating-coinciding Nash equilibrium
with change point c must satisfy T ≤ Tˆ ∗c . Putting this together with T ≥ T ∗c means that the only
possible starting point of a alternating-coinciding Nash equilibrium with change point c is Tˆ ∗c .
Claim 62. Let p1 < p2 < · · · < pK define a symmetric stingy quantum race. Let T ∗, T˜ ∗ be as in
Definition 20, 52, respectively. For any c > T ∗ we have T ∗ − 1 ≤ Tˆ ∗c ≤ T˜ ∗ + 1. If c and K have
the same parity then the tighter upper bound Tˆ ∗c ≤ T˜ ∗ holds.
Proof. Fix c > T ∗. For T < c of the same parity as c, we show that if rT,c > 0 then rT+1 > 0.
This implies Tˆ ∗c ≥ T ∗ − 1.
We have rT,c > 0 if and only if
1
pK
>
∑
i∈D(T+2,c−2)
p¯iq˜ +
K∑
i=c
≥
K∑
i=T+2
p¯iqi
This inequality follows from the fact that p¯iq˜i ≥ p¯iqi+p¯i+1qi+1. Thus we have 1/pK >
∑K
i=T+2 p¯iqi,
which implies rT+1 > 0.
Now let T,K, and c all have the same parity and suppose that r˜T > 0. This happens if and
only if
1
pK
>
∑
i∈D(T+2,K)
p¯iq˜i
≥
∑
i∈D(T+2,c−2)
p¯iq˜i +
K∑
i=c
p¯iqi
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This means that rT,c > 0. This shows that if c,K have the same parity then Tˆ
∗ ≤ T˜ ∗. If c,K have
opposite parity, then we can repeat the same argument to see that r˜T > 0 =⇒ rT+1,c > 0. Thus
in the case we have Tˆ ∗c ≤ T˜ ∗ + 1.
We can analogously show that for every time T there can be at most one change point c such that
there is an (T, c,K)-alternating-coinciding Nash equilibrium. For this we first need the following
claim.
Claim 63.
p¯t−1q˜t−1 − qt
(
pt − pt−1
pt−1
)
= p¯t−1qt−1 + p¯tqt .
Proof. First we expand the right hand side
p¯t−1qt−1 + p¯tqt = qt−1 − 1
pt−2
+
1
pt−1
+ qt − 1
pt−1
+
1
pt
= qt−1 + qt +
1
pt
− 1
pt−2
.
Next we expand the left hand side
p¯t−1q˜t−1 − qtpt − pt−1
pt−1
= q˜t−1 − 1
pt−2
+
1
pt
− 1
pt−1
(
1
pt−1
− 1
pt
)
+ qt .
Canceling like terms and rearranging, it suffices to show
q˜t−1 − qt−1 = 1
pt−1
(
1
pt−1
− 1
pt
)
,
which can be easily verified.
Lemma 64. For any time T there is at most one c such that there is a (T, c,K)-alternating-
coinciding Nash equilibrium (up to switching the roles of Alice and Bob).
Proof. We show that for any T there is at most one possible change point c for an alternating-
coinciding Nash equilibrium starting at T . For this we look at Eq. (88) and Eq. (89), which imply
that the change point c for an alternating-coinciding Nash equilibrium beginning at T must satisfy
p¯c−1q˜c−1 > RT,c > p¯c−1q˜c−1 − qc
(
pc − pc−1
pc−1
)
. (90)
Using Claim 63 we can rewrite Eq. (90) as
p¯c−1q˜c−1 > RT,c > p¯c−1qc−1 + p¯cqc . (91)
From the definitions, it can be verified that
RT,t+2 −RT,t = −p¯t−1q˜t−1 + p¯t+1qt+1 + p¯t+2qt+2 .
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Now suppose that
p¯t−1q˜t−1 > RT,t > p¯t−1qt−1 + p¯tqt . (92)
Then
RTˆ ∗,t+2 = RTˆ ∗,t − p¯t−1q˜t−1 + p¯t+1qt+1 + p¯t+2qt+2
< p¯t+1qt+1 + p¯t+2qt+2 .
This means that if RT,c satisfies Eq. (91), then no RT,t can satisfy this constraint for t ≥ c + 2, as
it will be smaller than corresponding lower bound in Eq. (90). This means that for each T , there is
at most c such that Eq. (91) is satisfied.
Finally, in the case of a convex quantum race we can more precisely pin down the exact form
of an alternating-coinciding equilibrium. If T ∗ is the starting point of the coinciding Nash equilib-
rium, then the support of any alternating-coinciding Nash equilibrium must begin in the interval
[T ∗ − 1, T ∗ + 2].
Theorem 65. Let p1 < p2 < · · · < pK define a 2-player convex symmetric stingy quantum
race. Let T ∗ be the starting point of the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Any alternating-coinciding
equilibrium must begin at either T ∗−1, T ∗, T ∗+1, or T ∗+2. In particular, there are at most four
alternating-coinciding equilibria (up to switching the roles of Alice and Bob).
Proof. We first we show the statement about the starting point of the interval. Let Tˆ ∗c = min{T :
rT,c > 0}. Claim 61 established that the starting point of a mixed Nash equilibrium with change
point c (if it exists) must be at Tˆ ∗c . By Claim 62, we have that T
∗ − 1 ≤ Tˆ ∗c ≤ T˜ ∗ + 1 for any
possible value of c. This part of the theorem now follows as Theorem 55 shows that for concave
probabilities T˜ ∗ ∈ {T ∗ − 1, T ∗, T ∗ + 1}.
The “in particular” line of the theorem now follows by Lemma 64. For each T ∈ [T ∗−1, T ∗+2]
there can be at most one c such that there is a (T, c,K)-alternating-coinciding Nash equilibrium.
Thus there can be at most four alternating-coinciding Nash equilibria (up to switching the roles of
Alice and Bob).
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